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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 670



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

IMPACT OF AFGHANI CRISIS ON THIRD WORLD

Afghanistan, Third World

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Feb 80 p 33

[Text] "The Third World with the Americans," "The nonaligned movement has exploded," "The whole world denounces the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan..."

There we see, among 100 more, a few headlines from the large Western bourgeois press. However, if that press, in fact, really gave itself the trouble of looking through the press of the anti-imperialist countries of the Third World, and if it were honest, perhaps it would change its tone. First of all, it would observe that no newspaper, no radio or television station of those countries has criticized or condemned Afghanistan for having asked the Soviets for military aid to preserve their national sovereignty and the integrity of their territory.

In Damascus, for example, the five participants in the ministerial conference of the Rejectionist Front: (Algeria, Syria, Libya, the PLO and South Yemen) have unanimously rejected any direct or indirect criticism of the USSR and denounced the policy of destabilization which the Americans are continuing in the Middle East. They, to the contrary, accused those who seek to hide from world opinion the true causes of the crisis which affects the region (a threat of economic and military intervention against Iran, but also a threat which affects all the progressive regimes of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the most powerful aeronaval armada which has ever been concentrated in this part of the world since World War II) and those who wish to make the Arab and Moslem peoples forget the rights of the Palestinian people to an independent and sovereign state and the treaty of surrender to Begin signed by Sadat.

In Angola and Mozambique, particularly, the reactions of the governments and the people were immediate: rejection of the UN General Assembly resolution and a defense without reserve of the right of the Afghan people to request the Soviet Union for aid or to request aid of any other anti-imperialist country to help it defend itself against the threats which menace it.

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In Madagascar and the Seychelles, two of the key objectives of the imperialist policy of destabilization, presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Rene took their position without equivocation: "In what name," the chief of the Malagasy State asked when he received the credentials of the new British ambassador, "can we condemn the Soviet Union, which signed a treaty of military cooperation with Afghanistan? We must treat all countries equally and the electoral problems of the Americans do not concern us.

"When the Americans install a military base in Cuba; when France, because of an agreement, gives military aid to Chad or with its soldiers puts David Dacko in power in Central Africa; when India aids Bangladesh secede from Pakistan, and when the South Africans send soldiers to Zimbabwe no one convokes the Security Council or an extraordinary General Assembly of the United Nations. We, ourselves, were recently called upon by a friendly country, the Seychelles, who fear an invasion by mercenaries. Although we have not signed a military cooperation agreement with Victoria, we have sent that country some troops. Madagascar's policy is made in Tananarive. It is not dictated from outside." As for the Seychelles chief of state, his position was also clearly defined by the editorial of the government daily, NATION: "We are convinced," this newspaper writes, "that if certain [imperialist] powers had not reinforced their presence and modernized their logistical bases, other powers would not have done the same and the tension would not have reached such an alarming threshold. Neither the events in Iran nor those in Afghanistan could possibly justify an increase in the foreign fleets near our coasts..."

It remains to be seen why some of the progressive nonaligned countries abstained from voting against the General Assembly resolution. Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad answered this question. He told certain Arab diplomats posted at Damascus that his first decision had been to vote against the resolution, but that it was the Afghan people's right to decide their own fate. Then Farouk Kaddoumi, the head of PLO diplomacy, stated the same thing. And if Damascus wound up by abstaining, it was because American propaganda had succeeded in transforming the "internal" Afghan affair into an East-West conflict. It was then necessary to keep from falling into that trap and not to give Washington the occasion, by exploiting that vote, to dig a trench between the countries of the Rejectionist Front, which would be hard to refill, and to accuse certain Arab countries of being aligned on the Soviet bloc: "Having stated that," Hafiz al-Assad specified, "all of us admit here in Damascus that the Afghan people have the sovereign right to call upon their friends to protect them against the maneuvers of the feudal Moslems in that region and against the masters of their thoughts." What the Western commentators or analysts seem to forget is that at the Havana summit it became clear that within the nonaligned movement an anti-imperialist advance guard was formed in defense of a policy of true nonalignment, which does not consist in placing the imperialist camp and the socialist camp on the same level. "The Soviet Union has been accused of 'interfering' in Afghan domestic affairs," according to one of the participants in the Damascus meeting, "but in fact

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it was not Moscow that 'interfered.' It was Pakistan, which is arming, financing and training the so-called Afghan rebels; it was the CIA, it was the secret service organizations of the feudal Arabs and Moslems. And it was against that interference that we must rise up. It is that interference which has constrained the Kabul regime to call upon Soviet troops who have promised to leave, upon the demand of the Afghan Government, when the frontiers of the country are no longer threatened.

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Afghan Flu Threatens Neutrals

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Feb 80 pp 34-35

[Editorial by Habib Boulares]

[Text] It is snowing on the Hindu Kush and the cold which covers Afghanistan a good part of the year has spread this winter to international relations. The Soviet armored cars which have replaced the Kabul regime kept the world from beginning the year of 1980 in peace.

Cold war is being spoken of again and the atomic specter haunts the screens and is silhouetted between the columns of the newspapers. The West, fattened by the policy of detente, is wondering whether in addition to the problems of petroleum and unemployment it will not find itself at the edge of the abyss. It is that the expression "cold war" does not have the same meaning for everyone. In the West it evokes the civil war in Greece, the Berlin blockade, the crushing of the Hungarian revolt, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, etc. Memory is currently being fed by the worries of NATO.

However, for the Third World, the historical cold war (1945-1962) was the golden age of decolonization, of the emergence of a group of states making a road between the two blocs, of the appearance and affirmation of the nonaligned movement, of the conquest of a national sovereignty which had as its effect the statement in new terms of the question of development and the rights of peoples to universal progress. Won't the return to East-West tension have again as a consequence a deep modification in international relations? Without any doubt! The crucial question, however, is to know who will pay the cost. Because we do not dare make any mistake about the nature of this war and believe that the Afghan flu has a sisterly resemblance to the sickness which has affected Europe for so long a time.

It is the Third World which today is the focus of covetousness and the tremors take place, as in seismology, at the places where the great continental plates collide and rub against each other. In the period which followed World War II, it was in Europe and Korea. In our days it is in western Asia, in the Middle East and in Africa where the confrontation is taking place. The front lines have been relocated and they have inter-penetrated each other.

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Third World Unity Threatened

The cold war had favored the appearance of a Third World which was struggling to decolonize itself and which was trying to affirm its nonalignment with respect to either one of the two protagonists. But what was this cold war? It was nothing more or less than the continuation of efforts carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States, starting in 1943-1944, to rule the world. The Soviet Union hoped to spread its influence as far as possible around its already immense territory; the United States wished to contain Moscow's ambitions. If the Third World was able to emerge and affirm itself little by little, it was because the countries which made it up did not directly depend on either one of the great powers.

For Washington as for Moscow, it was not at all a question of fighting to conserve for Great Britain, France or the Netherlands or Belgium their colonial empires. Even more, decolonization fitted very well with Soviet and American international policy, for diametrically opposed reasons. For the Soviets, it was a question of ideology; for the Americans, strategy. The only places where the mechanism broke down was in places where the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the United States were too closely approached: In Indochina, in Iran, but also in Cuba and Nicaragua. In those regions either a compromise was reached (Iran), or an open war was waged (Vietnam), or they even skirted a catastrophe before they reestablished a new balance of forces (Cuba).

Now the world has evolved in its geopolitical developments, in its nature and in the dimension of the problems that are set forth. Decolonization has transformed the international checkerboard; and access to political sovereignty has led the states of the Third World to struggle for their economic sovereignty and for their development on a plane of social equality. It is found that for historical and political reasons this new aspect of international politics is more embarrassing to the capitalist West, which depends upon sources of raw materials, than to the USSR. It is also apparent that the weaknesses of the Soviet systems (technology and food products) can find no remedy except in cooperation with the West. The Third World has a hold on the West through its raw materials. The West has a hold on the Soviet Union specifically by its wheat supply; the Soviet Union has a hold on the Third World through its role in its foreign and domestic struggles.

However, as the West also has a hold on the Third World through finance and trade, it is only in the developing countries, engaged in an intense struggle for the socialization of their economy, that the Soviet Union finds a favorable terrain for its worldwide policy. It is not: "I have a hold on you, you have a hold on me, on my throat"; it is rather "I have a hold on you, you have a hold on him, etc."

That decisive change in the basic elements of the international situation could not fail to redesign the lines of demarcation of the East West

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confrontation within the Third World group and it cannot fail to redesign those lines on the external boundaries of all three worlds either.

We have precise examples of this in Asia, above all in Africa, and even in Latin America. Also the exacerbation of the present conflict is of such a nature that it will seriously affect many data in different parts of the world.

The United States is already announcing that it will seek support, faced with a Sovietized Afghanistan, in Pakistan, Oman, Somalia and Kenya. They are calling on China to take complementary action. That would indicate a stepped-up pressure on Indochina, especially on Vietnam; but also a more substantial support for Thailand and Burma. How can it be believed that Somalia would not make its new closeness with the West be paid for by a clearer support against Ethiopia with regard to the Ogaden? How can one not be persuaded that the poor Eritreans will receive a more open bid from the West, at least through Saudi Arabia and the Sudan? The PLO also risks having to pay the expenses, in any case, of an increase in the Soviet role in the Palestine affair in favor of the hard-liners; or even the Americans, by applying pressure on Begin, would try to draw the moderates among the Palestinians toward the solution of the type of an independent Cisjordan and that would cause the PLO to explode; or perhaps they would accelerate the application of the Camp David agreement, and that is a great test for the PLO.

Nonalignment Up-dated

And what would become of the chain of bases under Soviet influence: South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, without forgetting Madagascar, Congo and Benin whose situations are different? Would Libya and Algeria lean toward the Soviet Union in such a new conflict? The Saharan affair might change its aspect.

In short, an exacerbation of the current East-West conflict would unavoidably bring about a deep division in the Third World, of which the nonaligned have already given us a picture in the United Nations. One of the first countries to suffer from it would probably be Zimbabwe with the crossfire of Mozambique and Zambian influences. From Indochina all the way to the heart of Africa, the chessboard would change its appearance. Detente has killed nonalignment. The new cold war endangers the unity of the Third World. Unless....

Unless the countries of the Third World remember the principles which founded nonalignment, unless they take care not to play the hysterical Western anti-Soviet game, and that they convince themselves that true development and its corollary, a new world order, have absolutely no chance of being brought about if the petty conflicts between neighboring states or superannuated ideological oppositions are not brought to an end if they are to consolidate their collective autonomy. All in all, it is a question

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of giving absolute priority to the project of the Third World over any other ideological consideration and, above all, over the vision of a bi-polar world which the great powers think about. It is not a question of power, since the weakest always has the ability to say no.

Nonalignment, in its essence and in its objectives, has never been so much up to date. Why should the Third World, like the West, find a change in regime in Central Africa by the effect of French intervention "normal" and in the same change brought about in Afghanistan by a Soviet invasion "abnormal?" Why should it agree with the Soviet version either?

It is now or never that an extraordinary conference of the nonaligned countries should be convoked. The delegates should accept in advance the risk of seeing some countries leave the movement. Only the recollection of the fundamental principles which gave birth to nonalignment could save the Third World and contribute to lessening international tension. In this perspective, only the current crisis would become profitable to the developing countries.

In the absence of this political "integralism" the Berlin wall would no longer be in Germany but would lend a sinuous path across Asia and Africa, while Latin America, whether it liked it or not, would still belong in the orbit of the United States, in its totality.

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CRUCIAL ROLES OF WHITE GENERALS EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 Feb 80 p 45

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Two Generals Versus Black Power"]

[Text] The southern tip of Africa is no longer part of that continent, save for a paradoxical situation. Never at any time in the past 2 decades has peace seemed so near in Zimbabwe and also in Namibia. Seldom, however, have the military made themselves so much the subject of conversation, for two men--two white generals--hold some of the keys to the immediate future.

The better known of the two, and also the one whose role could well be especially crucial, is a 53-year old senior officer with gray hair and a ruddy complexion: Peter Walls. To all the guerrillas in the "bush" he is in a sense the devil incarnate. To the handful of whites he has become God Almighty--and tomorrow, perhaps, will become their last resort. Walls is an "African" of the British Empire: born in 1926 to a family of colonists not far from the present Botswana border, he revealed at age 20 an aptitude for a military career. He served in the British colonial army in Somalia and subsequently in Malaysia in the late 1950's, and quickly became a specialist in "intricate coups" and counter guerrilla action. In 1965, when Ian Smith proclaimed Rhodesia's unilateral independence, Peter Walls did not hesitate: he foresaw the nationalist insurrection that would set the country ablaze and placed his talents at the service of the "disloyal state."

As chief of the "combined operations" and subsequently as commander in chief of the army he acquired the reputation of a man of "fire and steel." It was he who created the "Selous Scouts"--that elite corps which has been involved in unprecedented violence and whose brief history has been marked by civilian and military massacres. "In time of war," he explained on one occasion, "there is neither morality nor regrets. The important thing is to be effective." And Walls' troops are just that: in 6 years of conflict there have been virtually no desertions or mutinies. After the outset of the transitional period which was to conduct Zimbabwe to independence, and with the arrival of a British governor in Salisbury, Walls put his army of 100,000 men (80 percent of them black) in cold storage. He is biding his time, while playing the tactical game of loyalty--but without too much faith in Lord Soames, who he suspects wants to "sell out" the white community.

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And If Mugabe....

Walls has his candidates: Muzorewa, whose close adviser he is; and if absolutely necessary, Nkomo. He has one principal enemy: Robert Mugabe, together with those whom he calls the "red gooks," the "red terrorists." What will Walls and his officers do if on 29 February Mugabe wins the first free election in the history of Zimbabwe? There are those who whisper that he and his officers could then (as Smith did in 1965) take power and present themselves as "saviors" of the whites.

To accomplish this, however, Peter Walls would undoubtedly need the cooperation of another white general of southern Africa--a man he knows well and whose concerns coincide with his own. He is Magnus Malan, 49-year old commander in chief of the 250,000 troops of the South African army, who bears a surprising physical resemblance to his Rhodesian counterpart. Malan is one of those military men who are evolving in the wake of the present prime minister, Pieter Botha. They have replaced the civilians of the "Vorster apparatus" in all the key National Security and Defense posts.

In a little over 1 year South Africa has been transformed, and the role Malan plays is very important. He resolutely regards himself as a "modernist" and draws his inspiration to a great extent from the "Botha line," which calls for the liberalization of apartheid within the country and for creation of a belt of countries--a southern "buffer zone"--around South Africa consisting of countries governed by moderate black regimes.

Zimbabwe is quite obviously one of the "hot" links in that chain of countries, which comprise Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique. As a "political" general, Magnus Malan is not unaware of the effects that the advent to power of a Robert Mugabe in Salisbury could have on the longevity of white supremacy in South Africa. "With Machel and Mugabe at our gates," Malan explained 3 months ago, "the 'terrs' (terrorists) would have two sanctuaries on our borders. This is unacceptable. Our new policy would be rendered completely null and void." No doubt Peter Walls, from the depths of his armored residence in Salisbury, has found in these statements some comfort for the difficult days ahead.

PHOTO CAPTION

1. General Malan (upper) and General Walls: "putschists?"

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COVERAGE OF EVENTS BY 'JEUNE AFRIQUE' HIT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 3 Mar 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Simon Malley: "The Press: Wrecker of the Third World"]

[Text] JEUNE AFRIQUE has been exposed. Its ploy in the Maghreb must now withstand the light of day. The Tunisian weekly has lost its last veil at Gafsa on the occasion of the people's revolt, which in an interview granted to our colleague AL MOSTAKBAL, President Chadli Bendjedid himself defined as a "Tunisian internal affair." In other words, none of Tunisia's neighbors, neither Algeria nor Libya, can be implicated.

At a given period in its history, JEUNE AFRIQUE brought together fiercely anti-imperialist newsmen who were vigorously engaged in the defense of oppressed peoples. It has now erected the betrayal of those same peoples as a constant policy and set up support for the most tyrannical regimes as a permanent ethical principle. It is trying to take the banner of neo-colonialism and imperialism which it hoists as the flag of freedom!

In truth, one should scarcely be surprised, for like us, many prestigious progressive and revolutionary leaders in the Third World -- the African continent in particular -- will remember.

JEUNE AFRIQUE presented the murder of Amilcar Cabral by the lackeys of the Portuguese fascist colonial regime as the result of a plot by his own comrades in the PAIGC and Guinean President Sekou Toure. The Portuguese aggression instigated by Spínola against Guinea-Conakry was depicted by JEUNE AFRIQUE as nothing but an invention of Sekou Toure to divert attention from Guinea's domestic problems. For JEUNE AFRIQUE, the MPLA was but a minority movement without any real base among the people, while on the other hand, JEUNE AFRIQUE credited the people's support to Holden's FNLA and Savimbi's UNITA, which were linked to the CIA, the Portuguese colonialists and South Africa. In the Israeli state, JEUNE AFRIQUE sees a society that could serve as a model for the underdeveloped Arab world. And when Bob Denard's mercenaries invaded Benin, JEUNE AFRIQUE claimed it was the product of Kerekou's imagination!

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As for Abel Muzorewa, Smith's liege man in Salisbury, JEUNE AFRIQUE considers him the true leader of Zimbabwe, while Nkomo is the Soviet's man and Mugabe the servant of the Chinese! The bloody caricatures of statesmen a la Mobutu, Bongo, Bokassa, Hassan II and Pahlavi are courageous, clairvoyant, even visionary leaders! Mozambique, Angola and South Yeman are out-and-out supporters of the USSR, Madagascar has a regime whose foundations are crumbling, the Congo is a country that sells its sons and daughters to Cuba, while Afghanistan is a forward post of freedom that is defecting to the enemy. As for the POLISARIO Front, it is a gang of mercenaries who, for JEUNE AFRIQUE, are in the pay of Algiers and Tripoli.

Tripoli, Algiers, Algiers, Tripoli: names of capitals that frequently figure in the columns of the Tunisian weekly. Concerning Libya, "slick" news, exaggerated "reporting" has been legion for over 2 years.

But is it that little country with 2 million inhabitants that is the target? Is it the Libya with the poor means of information at which they are taking aim? Or is it its leader, the contradictions in certain aspects of whose foreign policy make an easy bull's eye, that they are after?

In spite of the press campaign orchestrated and fueled by the "revelations" so graciously furnished by the secret services of His Majesty Hassan II and His Excellency Habib Bourguiba to all the "friendly" embassies in Rabat and Tunis, who is about to believe that Qadhdhafi's Libya constitutes, as JEUNE AFRIQUE asserts, a "serious threat to the peace and security" of 300 million Africans and 100 million Arabs? No one, but it is first of all necessary to isolate Tripoli and make it, along with its leader Qadhdhafi, an ally one is ashamed to acknowledge, a discredited, boycotted and, in a word, dangerous ally. That is what JEUNE AFRIQUE is after, but in its line of sight is Algiers, the real objective.

This was inevitable, moreover, as soon as, following a 7-year-long war of liberation against French colonialism, Algeria, having seized its independence, chose the socialist and revolutionary path and liberation from neocolonial domination and the domination of Western interests. Its choice could not help upsetting Tunisia and Morocco, which for their part had adopted a liberal (!) capitalist regime. It was also inevitable when, as early as 1962, the editorial staff of the Tunisian newspaper JEUNE AFRIQUE foresaw the unavoidability of its ideological confrontation with Algiers. Indeed, the example of the Algerian revolution might give rise, among the peoples of the Maghreb, to a new awareness leading to upheavals harmful to the class interests of the financiers of JEUNE AFRIQUE.

Reconciling the unreconcilable, defending one without irrevocably antagonizing another: This was the tightrope on which the Tunisian weekly would walk beginning in July 1962, under Ben Bella, continuing under Boumediene and then Chadli Bendjedid. There were lulls, some scoffing at the Algerian authorities, attempts to promote certain "factions" every time that the JEUNE AFRIQUE staff calculated the victory of the reactionary forces enfeoffed to neocolonialism -- which discreetly supported the periodical

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in the name of freedom of the press -- over the most revolutionary socialist groups or any time it harbored the illusion that Algiers was going to leave the anti-imperialist camp. Outside of these "occasions," the well-fueled, inspired anti-Algerian campaign raged all the harder.

Following the summit conference of nonaligned nations in Algiers in September 1973, newsmen of all stripes, including French journalists with solid ties with certain wire services, sent up a test balloon for a "hegemonic design" of Algiers in the northern and southern Sahara. It was naturally necessary to tarnish the international influence of Algeria and its president.

When the balloon went flat, the weekly began to leaf through Algeria's political history for causes celebres it had not mentioned for 10 years!

But those who were cunningly trying to snuff out the live forces of the Algerian revolution unveiled their batteries as soon as the Saharan people launched their liberation struggle. The choice of JEUNE AFRIQUE was immediate: In 1963, it had supported Morocco in its military aggression against Algeria. In 1975, it was going to put all its newsmen, all its reporters, all its special envoys on a war footing for the purpose of trying to ridicule the Saharan underground soldiers and give the Algerian Government exclusive credit for the stunning victories won by the POLISARIO patriots over the legions of the despot in Rabat.

Freedom of peoples? Self-determination? The aspiration to independence and sovereignty of a nation whose sons are fighting and dying every day so that the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] may live? JEUNE AFRIQUE knows nothing about these things! Torture? The arrest of thousands of Moroccan patriots? JEUNE AFRIQUE is unaware of it! It is true that it is the Palace which supplies the "information," that such matters are talked about very little and that Hassan is always right! Besides, it is better to talk about human rights in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or Romania!

That is the background. And now, Gafsa, its people's revolt and the Tunisian weekly's attempt to implicate Algeria. Only a few minutes after the revolt started on 26 January, the king of Morocco telephoned Bourguiba: "Naturally, Qadhdhafi organized everything," he told him in a confidential tone. "But the real brain behind it is Algiers, you know. They must not be spared, even if you have to attack Qadhdhafi first for tactical reasons. Your principal adversary, our common adversary, has always been the Algerian regime. We have to admit that the hopes we formulated after Boumediene's death have come to nothing. We have to go on the attack. In the meantime, let your press have free rein..."

In response, Tunis began to speak about "local Algerian complicity," without directly denouncing the Algerian Government, however. As for JEUNE AFRIQUE, it did not hesitate. It asked the question: Is Algeria in on it? Yes or no? And all the while claiming that the Tunisian Government

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did not believe that Algiers was involved, it added that it "did not understand" why Algiers did not demonstrate "prompt solidarity with Tunisia" as Morocco did, as if the Algerians had nothing better to do than to follow in the footsteps of the clique of corrupt tyrants governing in Rabat.

JEUNE AFRIQUE went on to ask why one should not deal harshly with the Tunisian opponent Ibrahim Tobal, a well-known man respected and admired by the Arab peoples of the Maghreb and a resolute supporter of all Third World liberation movements, whose patriotism is only equalled by his courage in the struggle he is relentlessly waging against the regime of terror and oppression of Bourguiba and his lackeys?

Finally, the Tunisian weekly concludes by saying that it is "clear" that Algeria is not implicated in the Gafsa affair. It was only a jest and things will be left up in the air...but not for long.

A week later, "Algerians Involved in Gafsa" was JEUNE AFRIQUE's headline. LA PRESSE, a government daily in Tunis, then ran it on page 1. This time, it is not just a jest; they have the guilty parties! But who are they? Since it is above all a question of "divide and conquer," our Machiavellis begin by whispering that Algeria under Chadli is not the same as it was under Boumediene, that the latter held the reins of power more tightly than the former! Finally, the bomb: It was the party coordinator, Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, called the strong man of the FLN, who allegedly put everything together with the help of Slimane Hoffman, the party official in charge of international affairs, a man whom all Africa knows and respects for his unwaivering support for all national liberation movements.

That was that, or so they thought. A scapegoat had been found for the drama experienced by Tunisia under the regime of a sick man weakened and manipulated, at times by his wife Wassila, at times by shady, corrupt politicians such as Nouira-Sayah, at times by "legal" opponents a la Masmoudi or Mastiri. It was a classic technique: Guy Mollet and Anthony Eden had found their man: Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom they considered to be responsible for the war of liberation waged by the FLN since 1954 and for the "seizure" of the Suez Canal in 1956. For them, eliminating Nasser was a synonym of restoring the feudal system in Egypt and returning to a regional balance favorable to the West. In sum, it was a logic similar to that now prevailing in the case of Algeria and Libya and it was a matter of Israeli-French-British aggression.

The campaign orchestrated against Algiers by the Tunisian weekly JEUNE AFRIQUE is therefore neither innocent nor accidental. It is part of a Western strategy aimed at crushing Third World regimes that derive their vital substance from their determined commitment to the anti-imperialist, anticolonialist and anti-Zionist camp, a Western strategy that now bears a name: the "Carter doctrine."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WRITER INDULGES IN FANTASY FOR YEAR 2000

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 78-79

[Article by J.V.: "JEUNE AFRIQUE in the Year 2000"]

[Text] "The Chinese Federation," BBY [Bechir Ben Yahmed] scribbled, "is threatening to wipe out the South African Federation."

"How did you learn that?" Sennen asked.

"I didn't find out anything. But they won't dare deny it."

On 10 December 1999 there was a crowd in the great synthetic crystal ball occupying the Porte Maillot in Paris, site of the old Palais des Congres. Bechir Ben Yahmed, the J.A. [JEUNE AFRIQUE] Group's chairman-director general, decided to gather together all of the enterprise's staff, that is, about 3,000 people.

Thanks to "Juventine," the miracle pill invented 10 years previously by a Chinese doctor, Ben Yahmed was still young like all those surrounding him in the Crystal Palace setting. Among them a few veterans: Siradiou Diallo, first vice-president, Habib Boulares, second vice-president, Sennen Andriamirado, director general of publications, Jean Louis Buchet, director of audiovisual J.A., Abdelaziz Dahmani whose sharp columns everyone read.

Ben Yahmed stood up. "The year 2000," he declared, "will be that of our 2,000th issue. I have decided to give the event the fame it deserves. First by devoting a special issue to each of our publications: the four traditional weeklies, the audiovisual weekly, the two dailies, the one on paper and the one on cassettes, and the economic monthly. Five million copies of each of these issues will be printed."

A murmur of astonishment rose in the hall: The largest printings of the group's publications did not exceed 2,000,000 copies.

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"Our radio station and our television channel," Ben Yahmed continued, "are going to prepare programs devoted to this anniversary. Our press agency will be mobilized. We must think of public demonstrations. Our publishing house is going to put out a large book that will review our history. We need ideas, lots of ideas. Let us have yours. The best one will receive as a prize a year's leave on double salary." The murmuring in the hall turned into quivering.

Sennen Andriamirado heard the ringing of his audiophone. It was audible only to him: It came from a wave transmitted through the right bow of his glasses. Marshal Lamizana wanted to speak to him urgently. The marshal at that time was president of the Federal Republic of Africa's 15, of which Ouagadougou was the capital. The discovery in 1985 in the Fada N'Gourma area of a fabulous petroleum deposit, then still the main source of energy utilized, transformed Upper Volta's situation.

During the 5 years following that discovery, this country became the richest in the world. Thereafter, when petroleum was used less and less as a fuel, it was able to use its raw material to supply a technologically advanced petrochemical industry.

During the same period, the perfecting by a German scientist of synthetic coffee and cacao severely hurt the African coastal countries' economy. Manpower, especially Ivorian manpower, began to pour into Upper Volta in such numbers that it was necessary to take steps to limit that emigration. At that time, Lamizana succeeded in convincing the leaders of the other 14 West African countries to set up a federal republic which, thanks to the Upper Voltan petrochemical industry and to Nigerian uranium, was to experience rapid development.

Sennen entered an office adjoining the Crystal Palace area, a crystal made by the Bobo-Dioulasso petrochemical complex. He listened. "I need you," he heard. "I need all of your group's means. The situation is grave. The South African Federation has decided to wipe us out."

Since the time when the Upper Voltan petrochemical engineers learned to transform black gold into yellow gold, the precious metal had lost its value.

The consequences of that discovery were considerable: As soon as it became public, those holding yellow metal sought to sell it, provoking a sudden collapse of prices. The South African gold mines were forced to suspend their activities.

"I have warned the Band of Four," the marshal went on. "They did not believe me. Unless they are conniving with the South Africans... They have stocks of gold they don't know what to do with."

At that time the presidents of the four major federations, the American, the European, the Soviet and the Chinese, were called the "Band of Four."

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Together they had set up the Great World Council to replace the United Nations which had died of old age.

"What can we do?" Sennen asked.

"Warn public opinion. Provoke demonstrations. Force the powers to intervene. You alone with your independence and the broad scope of your information media can prevent a disaster." A quarter of an hour later, the J.A. group's brain trust held a meeting.

The radio began first. With every broadcast brought to a halt, special news flashes crackled. "Attention! The South African Federation has decided to wipe out the Africa of the 15. An attack is apparently imminent. Marshal Lamizana has informed the Great World Council.

"Attention! Peace is endangered. The South African Federation must know it will not survive any aggression against the Africa of the 15. The Band of Four must clearly and without delay express itself on this matter."

Ben Yahmed scribbled a few lines and handed the sheet of paper to Sennen who read it stupefied: "The Chinese Federation has just declared it will wipe out the South African Federation if the latter attacks the Africa of the 15."

"How did you learn that?" Sennen asked.

"I didn't find out anything," Ben Yahmed retorted, "but they won't dare issue a denial."

A few moments later, the agency's Telex disseminated the "news."

In Paris, on the group's appeal, a demonstration of over 100,000 people formed on the Champs Elysees. The television cameras got pictures of the parade. Satellites transmitted them causing similar demonstrations everywhere.

In South Africa the blacks emerged from their Bantu territories to which since the closing down of the gold mines they were more than ever restricted. To the general surprise they succeeded in seizing one-third of the country's dramatically underpopulated territory and to secure several materiel depots.

Heavily stricken by the economic crisis, the whites defended themselves only feebly. Twenty-four hours after the attack began, the Pretoria government resigned. J.A. celebrated its 2000th issue.

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BURUND1

BRIEFS

EDF AID--An Agreement involving about 10 billion Burundi francs (500 million French francs) was signed on 11 January in Bujumbura by the Republic of Burundi, the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) within the framework of the Lome II convention. The Burundi and EDF delegations, in the course of negotiations which preceded the signing of the agreement, established the priority development objectives which will be financed by the EDF, in accordance with the directives of the 5-year development plan which were defined by the Burundi government. Thus 34 percent of the total amount will be earmarked for the rural development sector, 13 percent for transportation and communications and 14 percent for mines and energy. Health and education will have a financial share on the order of 15 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 269] 8143

JAPANESE GIFT--Japan will give Burundi a gift of 100 million yen (about 1.6 million French francs) pursuant to an agreement signed on 23 January in Bujumbura by the Burundi minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, Lt Col Edouard Nzambimana, and the Japanese ambassador to Burundi, Kazuo Yamashita, who has his residence in Kinshasa. This gift will be used for the supplying of Burundi hospital establishments with pharmaceutical products and medical materials. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 269] 8143

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FRANCE SAID TO HAVE ECONOMIC STRANGLEHOLD

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 Feb 80 p 51

[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "France Regains Power"]

[Text] It is a genuine return to power that France is preparing to accomplish in Central Africa. Indeed it was inconceivable that after having arranged the expulsion of Jean-Bedel Bokassa the French Government would not try to gain the greatest advantage from the new situation. Previously, in deciding to suspend aid authorized for the old regime after publication of the African judges' inquiry commission report on the murders of children, Paris had set in motion the developments that were going to end in the despot's removal.

The day after Bokassa's expulsion the new Central African president, David Dacko, did not hesitate to state that the French soldiers who had intervened to drive out the dictator could stay in the country as long as they wished. They will not be the only ones. To try to rectify catastrophic economic conditions the new government in Bangui has decided to thoroughly play their French card.

Restoring Financial Health

On 20 January 1980 Central African Prime Minister Bernard Ayandho made a request to Raymond Barre, his French counterpart. The Bangui government was soliciting from Barre Paris' cooperation to help restore the country's financial health. The French answer--affirmative, of course--was not long in arriving. Were they worried about avoiding being surpassed by possible competition? Still, as early as 5 February the French Minister of Cooperation let the Central African government know the major outlines of an immediate plan. An outlay of 30 million French francs (one billion 500 million francs CFA) was immediately made available to Bangui.

But to sustain operating expenses, restore the country's credit and guarantee the recovery of state companies and organizations, the program set in operation jointly by Central Africa and France anticipates a series of Draconian

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measures. Thus reduction of civil service personnel will be accompanied by a wage freeze during the entire year. In addition the reorganization of the investment laws will be followed by a tax review. Similarly a program to regulate existing debt will be established to allow redetermining priorities.

Because the structures set up are worthwhile only for the men entrusted with making them work, France is also taking all measures to avoid past waste. At the risk of seriously losing the country's independence, French technical aid will be substantially strengthened. One can also speak of a genuine seizure by France of Central Africa, since the economy's key areas will be controlled by technical advisers straight from Paris. The strategic positions of "inspection managers" of expenditures invested and of the CAADE (Independent Liquidation Fund of Existing Debt) will be in foreign hands.

Nominal Independence

The president himself of the Central African Republic and the controller of state companies will also be aided by economic advisers and financial experts sent by France. Twenty years after it achieved independence the Central African Republic thus provides additional proof that this independence remains in name only. Moreover this situation is not to the honor of the other African countries, who should have been able to seize this opportunity to prevent a foreign power from interfering in the continent's business. Thus they would have contributed to making sure that Africa belongs to the Africans.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

RIGHT TO STRIKE TEMPORARILY MAINTAINED--The right to strike was not abolished by the president on 4 January, contrary to certain reports recently spread abroad, according to the French press agency (AFP). It will be recalled that on 4 January, with members of the press attending, he received a delegation of the General Union of African Workers (UGTC). On that occasion Mr Dacko expressed his wish to abolish the right to strike. "Strikes will be banned in 1980," Mr Dacko declared, but subsequently surrendered to the arguments of the delegation, for whom such a measure seemed unfavorable to the country's image. Mr Dacko deplored the savagery of the strikes and allowed the union 2 months to "educate the workers." The right to strike is thus maintained officially until expiry of the period of grace granted by the government to the UGTC. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 147] 7129

SOCADA ESTABLISHED--By an order dated 2 January 1980, the Central African Agricultural Development Company (SOCADA) was established. It is a joint venture in which the state and the French company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT) are cooperating. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 147] 7129

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COMORO ISLANDS

COMORO PRESIDENT DISCUSSES REGIONAL RELATIONS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Feb 80 pp 358-360

[Report on interview with President Ahmed Abdallah, in Paris, by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Indian Ocean Surrounding the Comoros"; date not given]

[Text] Following in the wake of a Comoro delegation that came here at the end of November to settle various technical problems with the minister of foreign affairs, as he often does at this time of year, President Ahmed Abdallah himself in Paris recently engaged in high-level discussions which his former term of office as a senator taught him to be of use. On this occasion, he confided to reporters that his discussions in Paris had fortunately made up for certain disappointing aspects of local cooperation. Actually, instead of the worried man they had taken their leave of a few months before, his interviewers found him to be a leader in full possession of his powers who has rediscovered his talent for lively repartee and waggishness, tinged at times with black humor.

Of course, not all the reasons for his concern have been dissipated. A certain uneasiness continues to reign among the youth of the islands. But, he told us, the resulting outbursts are now subject to simple police action and no longer, as was the case during his predecessor's reign, to sentences spent in the horrible dungeons of Ntsunjini. Moreover, outbursts were difficult to indulge in during Ali Soilih's reign. It was especially suspicion that provided grounds for prosecution. In any event, today no favoritism mars the exercise of a paternal kind of justice, whether the accused be the grandson of a prime minister or a young arsonist, also of good family, "who had learned his trade in 1968 at the Chamber of Deputies and the secondary school and wanted to offer a new sample of his talents at a service station."

The president did not expand on the reasons behind this unrest. A result of the effect of the economic situation on employment? "It is in fact detestable," he replied, "but not tragic. We are poor, not miserable." In his opinion, the unrest is maintained from behind the scenes by groups of MOLINACO [National Liberation Movement of the Comoro Islands] emigres who, in Kenya or in France, are trying to sell their opposition to foreign

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services. "Amnesty International, an institution I revere and which is a permanent guest on the Comoro Islands, has been a victim of their lies. I mention this only for the record, since it has itself rectified the reports of supposed attacks against human rights and of political murders."

Actually, of the 800 arrests made since 13 May 1978, 43 have been upheld. These involve individuals who, under cover of political events or on the fringe of these events, have been guilty of crimes or misdemeanors under common law and must stand trial. "This is a matter for the courts, not for me. I will be concerned with their cases only to exercise my power of pardon, as necessary" Is this a likely prospect? "I have no taste for cruelty. This would not be the first time I have exercised this power."

The reasons for unrest which have to do with the [territorial] integrity of the Islamic Republic of the Comoros and its position in the chess game the Indian Ocean is the scene of are obviously more serious. They do not dampen the optimism of the president for whom, considering the modest size of the islands, it would be repugnant to have the world believe that he is setting himself up as its conscience, but who for all that has not hesitated to express an original point of view on the great problems of our times either through his silence or in a more positive manner. At the OAU summit meeting in Monrovia, his representative refused to have anything to do with a motion directed against Morocco. More recently, the Comoro Islands have officially stated their claim to the Iles Glorieuses, under French sovereignty but claimed by Madagascar. For the Olympic Games, Comoro diplomacy will align itself with the decisions reached in Islamabad. Moroni is not affiliated with the World Olympic Committee. For it, the matter remains of secondary interest; its real interests are elsewhere.

Overlapping of Conflicts

"I believe," said the president, "in the importance of the strategic position of the Comoro Islands, but it is not my role to constantly remind people of it. I suppose that the French Government can gauge its importance as well as I can." How can we contest the fact when the United States hangs on to the minuscule island of Diego Garcia while the anchorage of Mayotte is one of the finest in this part of the world? A game is being secretly played, one whose ramifications the French public seems to be unaware of.

At the urging of Mr Didier Ratsiraka, the Victoria conference, held in the Seychelles in April 1978, laid the foundations for a union of the progressive island parties of the southwestern part of the Indian Ocean. Paradoxically, the Comoros did not join because of the poor relations maintained as a result of what happened in 1977 at Majunga between the Malagasy president and Ali Soilih. Since relations have not improved since Mr Ahmed Abdallah's return to power and since no Comorian progressive party has been accredited by the Victoria organization, it is hard for Moroni not to feel itself somewhat "marked" by its neighbors.

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In this island conference, the immediate danger comes neither from Mr Berenger's Mauritians nor Mr Verges' Reunion islanders, but from a Malagasy maritime expansionism which, not content with interfering with the islands' food supply by eliminating Air Madagascar service, is intervening in the Seychelles with the Malagasy Air Force, two warships and two companies of infantry, supporting the Tanzanian forces already there and, in the name of the inviolability of colonial borders, demanding that France turn over the uninhabited islands located to the west and north of Grande Ile, including the Iles Glorieuses, which closely affect the Comorians. The orientation of the conference "observers," at least some of whom it is today planned to make permanent partners, also contributes toward the maintenance of apprehensions concerning the Mozambique FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front], the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

We can thus see the three games for which this part of the world is the stake superposing themselves, as though we were using three pieces of tracing paper.

The most important involves the whole planet. The name of this game is control of the sea lanes serving the West from the Middle East oil reserves with the critical intervening ports of call: the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and the Mozambique Channel. The occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces makes protection of the first of these a current issue. The presence of these forces in Ethiopia and Aden already denies us the use of the second in case of war. Can we deny that we are interested in an action aimed at cutting off the third by specifically obtaining the dismantling of the American base on Diego Garcia which guarantees free access to it, as one of the conference motions demands?

The second game is the one France is playing to preserve its particular interests within the international flow of oil supply and to protect the French department of Reunion as well as an economic and cultural activity that has been maintained for three centuries, with alternating successes and setbacks, on Madagascar and the Mascarene Islands. In this game, France enjoys the sympathy of many Arab countries, but has no official ally, unless it be precisely the Islamic Republic of the Comoros, to which it is bound by an external defense treaty. The presence of France on Reunion, on the other hand, is openly contested by almost all the conference participants. One of the motions supports the people of Reunion's claim to self-determination.* Another speaks out in favor of evacuation of the French troops concentrated there. Moreover, let us remember that as early as 1973 the Tanzanian minister of foreign affairs, in the presence of the

* This is the expression employed in the motion in consideration of the presence of Mr Verges who calls for autonomy. The candidacy of the independent "Marxist-Leninist Communist Organization of Reunion" at the conference is such that it will radicalize demands having to do with that island.

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entire diplomatic corps, demanded France's departure from Saint Denis.

A paradox: In this second-degree conflict, it is precisely the Republic of the Comoros which French arguments for the sovereignty of Mayotte, themselves in contradiction with the votes of the international community as expressed at the United Nations, oppose.

The third game is the responsibility of the Republic of the Comoros itself. It is not the easiest one to play since, because of their insularity, in their daily lives members of the local elite can only with difficulty make up their minds to subordinate family or party considerations to national priorities. We must, however, remember that this elite is emerging from a nightmare during which for 4 years it had to sustain repeated attacks, the vestiges of which will for a long time remain painful, against what is the primary basis for its identity: its religious faith. According to the local interpretation, it was not Col Mustafa Mhadjou, alias Bob Denard, but France which made possible the president's return, the reestablishment of Islam. Familiarity and cultural affinities no doubt have formed the many bonds between the islands and our country. Perhaps they would not have sufficed to let us stand for the alienation of Mayotte, since island unity constitutes the other pillar of national identity, if this objective alliance between France and Islam were not also today jointly admitted to our way of thinking.

During the recent discussions in Paris, devoted to problems of economic and technical coordination between the Islamic Republic and Mayotte, the idea of a grant of aid contributed by France to the Comoros as a whole for the teaching of the Koran may have been voiced by a Comoro delegate. The suggestion probably produced astonishment, even shock, which shows that Paris would stand to gain from having a better idea of the real reasons for the Comorian reactions. President Ahmed Abdallah is also striving to protect this psychological balance when he describes France's presence on Mayotte as "a temporary, friendly occupation."

In this game, Moroni's dominant concern is thus the defense of Islam and attachment to those who, practically speaking, are alone capable of assuring it. The potential or recognized adversaries are those whose threat to Islam is manifest and direct due to their political allegiance to Moscow, which is the case for most of the parties that participated in the Victoria conference. The judgment is more delicately shaded for the Tanzanians. They are not an Islamic people, even though there are many Moslems among them. On the other hand, the memories of the Zanzibar massacres, which cost the Comorian diaspora a heavy tribute in blood, and of a recent military occupation are enough to hope that proper trade relations will not turn into embraces that are too close for comfort.

As for Madagascar, the rancor and mistrust aroused by the 1977 race riots and the expulsions Comorian nationals were the victims of under pitiful conditions of destitution are tempered for Comoro quadragenarians by their memories of secondary school pupils or students in Tananarive during the

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colonial period, the free and easy handling of affairs here and there, the French language and the feeling that the gap created between the two countries, natural trade partners, has arisen due to a misunderstanding.

"We regard the Malagasy as brothers," President Ahmed Abdallah explained to us. "They are no doubt our only non-Moslem neighbors whom we accord this honor. We have every reason to be annoyed with them, yet it is they who are annoyed with us. Who can understand why? This family quarrel, absurd as such quarrels always are, will probably come to an end some day."

President's Remarks

This triple grid enables us to interpret the impact of French policy on the Indian Ocean and particularly on the Comoros. In a world devoted to secondary conflicts, where the clashes of the two [major] blocs are implemented by buffers, can we predict where the next abscess will form? Not a probability, but a possibility of conflict underlies the notion of critical point: the day when, because of a delicate internal situation or some sort of upheaval, one of the parties in question, catalyzing his forces elsewhere, finds himself in a situation of inferiority. If, for example, it were a matter of defending Reunion, should we apply to Mayotte — toward and against all — the policy of "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" or strengthen this defense without confronting the international community, rather with Arab help, by opening the way to the unity and prosperity of the Comoros?

This grid is no less useful in deciphering the flashes of wit and cutting remarks President Ahmed Abdallah most readily resorts to in expressing himself: "The future of Mayotte? But any way you look at it, for us Mayotte is the present! We make no distinction in the government and the administration between someone from Grande Comore, Anjouan, Mayotte or Moheli. Or rather, if we do make one, it is only to the extent an unofficial quota should maintain a balance of influence among the people from these four islands. Thus our minister of finance is from Mayotte, our attorney general too and also our director of state property. Of the scholarships granted by the government for Paris, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Riyadh, Kuwait and even Tripoli, Mayotte gets its share, proportional to its number of candidates.

"I further maintain that Mayotte is an integral part of the Comoros. This is not only a Comorian attitude, but also a French one. I mean to say that, even today, France admits that this is so, with no doubt at all for some or without wishing to recognize the fact for others. In the arsenal of agreements that tie us to our former mother country, there is one which we particularly cling to, which entrusts to France the external defense of the Comoros. This agreement makes no distinction between the defense of Mayotte and that of the islands at present constituting the Islamic Republic. It does not specify the names of each of the islands to which it applies. It speaks simply of the Comoros, which tends to prove that they exist and that their defense is not guaranteed by France from some foreign territory.

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"This ambiguity has produced a situation whereby," the president went on, "when the Mayotte affair came before the international tribunals, they were a bit embarrassed and got off the hook — the United Nations as well as the OAU — by advising us to find an amicable solution. That is what we are doing. In reestablishing technical or administrative ties between Mayotte and the rest of the islands, our November discussions had no other purpose but to gradually bring the future into the present. One of our proverbs says that a coconut cannot be measured with a piece of steel."

[Question] But aren't you, specifically you, going to come into conflict with France on the Iles Glorieuses issue?

[Answer] In any event, that is not our aim. I have no desire to come to grips with France. Whatever they may have said, I have never done so in the past, not even when we achieved our independence. It was not I who proclaimed it, but the Territorial Assembly, whose will I confirmed. All right. When France gave Madagascar its independence, it was faced with the problem of the future of Nossi Be and Sainte Marie because of their history, the origins of their population, etc. Finally, France felt that they were too close to Madagascar not to share the same fate as the latter. In the same way, Banc Geser and the Glorieuses form a unit frequented by Mayotte fishermen and are close to their coasts. Thus there is no historical argument in justification of separating them.

On the other hand, Madagascar lays claim to Juan de Nova, Europa, Bassas da India, Tromelin and the Glorieuses. Since these are islands without permanent inhabitants, this claim is based on the fact that France had attached them to Tananarive for administrative purposes. But this was also the case for us! Are we to conclude that Madagascar claims us? The absurdity of such thinking is obvious, even taking into account the fact, as was the case during the "Mayotte secession," of a supposed Sakalawa influence over Mayotte that presumably goes back to Andriantsouli, one which has given those involved something to laugh about.

[Question] So your claim to the Glorieuses is opposed to Madagascar's?

[Answer] Not at all. Our claim is directed against neither Madagascar nor France. The Glorieuses and Banc Geser ought to share the fate of Mayotte. This is a simple question of common sense. The fish and shellfish, or the bounty of the sea, naturally belong to those who gather them.

Rule of Three

Then President Ahmed Abdallah returned to other topics, of more immediate interest to him. In 1979 the budget was with difficulty balanced at 3 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs and at the cost of substantial sacrifices by Comoro officials. "With us, the age pyramid is such that 50 percent of our expenditures are devoted to education. This is why the Comoros are asking for aid in this field from all their friends. We

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need 180 teachers. The cooperation agency offered me five. Finally, I landed 50. Other countries, like Belgium and Senegal, have provided their share. France too has sent us a few doctors."

More than ever, the trade balance shows a deficit. Copra, clove and vanilla prices are holding steady but ylang-ylang is not selling well. Development of production has been retarded by technical (Ali Soilih had the clove trees uprooted) and land problems. The reestablishment of the right to own land in the context of a return to a liberal economy can, however, only be justified if the landowners properly exploit their property.

In the eyes of President Ahmed Abdallah, the essential problem is still communications. The break in trade relations with Madagascar has made the Comoros more keenly than ever feel the need for a port that can handle medium-tonnage ships, one from which coasters can fan out to the other islands. The work completed in 1967 at Mutsamudu with FED financing stemmed from a good choice. The president refuses to say so "because his himself from Anjouan." The site is the most suitable for the operation, the most central and the one preferred by the shipping companies. In the field of air communications, the Comoros have with satisfaction noted the French Government's decision to restore Ahaya and provide it with the necessary improvements.

The Comoros welcome tourists but the government does not favor mass tourism which changes customs without really generating income. "Naturally, we are committed to the sea. We should develop fishing and, furthermore, at the same time we must combat the damage inflicted on our coasts by the 6,000 oil tankers that pass within range of them each year. It is indispensable for us to set up a maritime control organization with our neighbors.

"In these various fields of endeavor, our initial state of poverty induces us to turn to France, without, however, neglecting our Arab brothers, other friendly countries and big international banks or funds, like the IBRD, the FED or the BAD [African Development Bank]. We would merely like to bring up three important points at this time," — President Ahmed Abdallah got up — "that often seem to be forgotten. Whether they have to do with general policy or economic support, the decisions that concern us must not be made only in terms of French internal considerations. We do not contest the interest involved, but these considerations are not necessarily attuned to the pace the world is moving at and, because of this, the resulting decisions would run the risk of coming too late. For the same reason, we fear the slow developments structural changes in the context of French cooperation would engender. And finally, we think that the specificity of our situation and the responsibilities it lays on our shoulders ought to encourage our friends to figure our share in the distribution of aid to the Third World otherwise than in terms of a simple rule of three."

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IVORY COAST

AFTERMATH OF PRESIDENT'S 7 DECEMBER ADDRESS EXAMINED

Growth, Crisis

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 pp 63-65

[Article by Jacques Latremolliere]

[Text] The multiplication of life, as also the abundance and diversity of documentation, render all photography of the activities of the Ivory Coast difficult, even if the photography were instantaneous. The difficulty increases if one wishes to appraise future developments on the basis of past performances. That is why, in connection with this country's having become a state, a country that is being transformed before our eyes from a state into a nation--a very rare change in tropical Africa--one finds many sectorial studies, but few attempts at synthesis. One would give up attempting the undertaking if the message from President Houphouet-Boigny in Katiola to his fellow citizens this past 7 December, on the occasion of the anniversary of the independence, did not furnish at one and the same time a framework within which to place the main themes and a shuttle to link them all together.

The tenor of this message oscillates between two poles: a desire to go ahead and a desire to consolidate what has been acquired:

- To speculate, avoiding maximum chances, without complacency with respect to the risk to be faced.

- To assume the responsibility for all consequences, including errors, until patience and competence transform them into partial success, then into victory or, on the contrary, until their abandonment constitutes a new wager, outside of any dogmatism.

- Following the same procedure, but inversely, fiscal exoneration of the least advantaged, support of basic food products, aid for unemployment, discounts for transportation fares, the pursuit of economic housing plans

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do not mean falling into the noose of a paralyzing bureaucracy, do not mean giving up a fiscal structure that favors investment. They also do not exclude the cooperation of immigrants with respect to agriculture, nor that of expatriates, which the accelerated introduction of technology in the Ivorian economy will render indispensable as long as the efforts that have been put forth for 20 years for education--33 percent of the budget, a 17 percent rate of school attendance, 16,000 new primary classes, 113 lycees and public secondary schools, soon 4 large colleges and the University of Bouake--do not assure the country not only an adequate framework, but also the means of regenerating it.

This dual tactic is a strategy that is based abroad on peace, the respect of national independencies, the loyalty of traditional friendships, but also the demand for more equitable worldwide trade conditions, in which the guarantee of exportations instituted by the EEC [European Economic Community] association marks only a first milestone. Domestically, the priority objective is to channel resources--without excepting oil which, beginning in 1980, will make a modest appearance in the Ivorian panoply--toward assistance to the peasants, the instrument and aim of all progress. To animate all of this, a developmental political system that ignores a rift in public opinion, arranges consultations for agreement, but strikes at the roots of opposition and leaves to the president of the republic the initiative and the financial means for investment. Thus the two poles of Ivorian policy manifest to a large degree courage and tenacity, embodied by the man who is at its head.

The anniversary message is also a pre-electoral program. Essentially Houphouet-Boigny will commit himself to this to the Ivorians in connection with the renewal of his presidential contract.

The Economic Situation and the Debt

This liberal philosophy, which is the exact opposite of an ideology, would not be able, however, to free a country that is deeply involved in the flow of world trade from the results of an unfavorable economic situation. The traditional agricultural sector is even more dependent on these factors than other sectors, being the shock absorber of the economic and social blows born of the crisis, progressively becoming more limited as a consequence of the introduction in regions up to then not very developed, of new speculations, like sugar cane and soya beans, whose looked for enrichment is affected by exportation and the modernization of the tools of production.

Without breaking away from basic financial balances, the country has nevertheless succeeded in maintaining a high level of growth. Even though the increase in oil prices generally had affected the average annual rate of

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overall growth in other countries under development that are exporters of non-energy raw materials, because of a drop in foreign demand, the rate for the Ivory Coast went from 6.2 percent during 1966-1973 to 4.9 percent in 1975, and 5.5 percent in 1977.

This Ivorian result is due in part to the mobilization of domestic savings, but it is explained above all by a significant recourse to the international money market, unfortunately under less advantageous conditions than before, from the point of view of interest rates and terms of repayment, because of stagnant foreign public assistance and the correlative increase in private bank transfers. The Ivory Coast furthermore has not abused short-term periods. Its foreign public debt includes a good number of loans that are repayable in 5 years, becoming due between 1980 and 1985.

The progress of agricultural production for exportation and the strong recovery with respect to the production of food, after several mediocre harvests, as well as the quite appreciable progress in the matter of investments under these circumstances in 1978 resulted in a growth of more than 10 percent, in actual value, of the gross domestic product. What is more, this growth, which is quite evenly distributed among the various sectors of activity, coincided with a decrease in the price of food products owing to the curbing of monetary expansion. While the foreign aid contribution was reduced during this fiscal period, it was still determinant with respect to the positive balance in the balance of accounts. At the end of December 1978, the overall foreign debt amounted approximately to 1,000 billion CFA.

The recourse to foreign capital thus was generally beneficial which explains, more than any other amount, the average annual growth of 11 percent of the national revenue for the 1975-1978 period, while the comfortable bolstering of public investment budgets made it possible to undertake some big road or port infrastructure projects, which in turn are generators of future resources because of the regional integration that they provide.

The year 1979 nevertheless gave evidence of a rude slowing down, felt above all in the building and public works areas, but it also affected the service sector and agriculture, with a consequent much more moderate expansion after the 1978 effort at recovery. In spite of a certain increase in coffee prices, the basic quotation for exported products did not furnish sufficient compensation for these abatement factors, and there was a resultant drop in the rate of progression for the domestic gross product estimated at the end of the year at about 6 percent. This percentage is still very respectable, as were the initial total of 239 billion CFA¹ of the special investment budget and the 10 percent increase, compared with the preceding year, in the gross fixed capital that partially flows from them.

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Nevertheless, contrary to 1978, this evolution occurred in an atmosphere of an increase in domestic prices, first of all in connection with food products, then in connection with imported products, because of successive increases in oil prices and the resumption of inflation in supplier industrialized countries, which aggravated the social impact. "The dissatisfaction and the anxiety" to which President Houphouet-Boigny refers in his message stem from these factors, "both because of the difficulty of apprehending the problem and that of solving it."

Evolution of the Balance of Payments

(in billions CFA)

| | <u>1977</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>1979*</u> |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Merchandise | +140.1 | + 49.4 | + 35.4 |
| Services | -107.9 | -124.6 | -139.2 |
| Transfers | - 81.3 | - 87 | - 97 |
| Errors/Omissions | - 0.3 | ---- | ---- |
| Balance | + 44.7 | +13.8 | - 29.8 |

* Estimates at 30 June 1979

How is the situation expressed in terms of the economy? The trade balance surplus has decreased considerably. The progression in the deficit of the services balance continues, but to a lesser degree than in the previous years, in consequence of the development of the Ivorian merchant marine and a lesser increase in freight prices. On the other hand, the transfers deficit increased more rapidly in 1979 than in 1978, because of the regression in foreign aid and greater participation on the part of the Treasury in foreign technical expenditures. The financing of public and para-public infrastructures, whether in the agro-industrial, transportation, electric energy, or oil refining sector, in spite of everything has maintained a significant flow of capital. Taking into account these various elements, the negative balance in the balance of payments will probably go quite a bit beyond the 30 billion francs CFA that had been estimated at the end of the first semester.

The occurrence is noteworthy only because it is a question of the greatest deficit recorded by the Ivory Coast, and because it comes after three years of surplus. As a matter of fact, it is not the deficit in the balance of payments, perfectly adjustable from one fiscal year to another,

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that causes the appearance of a "red figure," but rather the amount of the total foreign debt, the nature of its components, and the annual services that it involves, and will involve. At the end of 1979, the amount will be 1,200 billion CFA, that is, an increase of 23 percent compared with 1978, the latter having been only 4.5 percent the preceding year. The percentage of private credits in the foreign debt portion which until 1978 was dependent on the administration of the Autonomous Sinking Fund², that is State loans (63 percent), exceeds 54.1 percent, compared with 35.5 percent in 1977, whereas one observes the stagnation or the regression of credits from suppliers, bonds, shares from international organizations, from governments, or foreign public institutions.

| Total Debt Increase Since 1974 | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|
| | <u>Percent</u> |
| From 1974 to 1975 | 22. |
| From 1975 to 1976 | 58.6 |
| From 1976 to 1977 | 78.8 |
| From 1977 to 1978 | 5.5 |
| From 1978 to 1979 | 16.6 |

| Relation of Debt Service ot Exports | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|--|----------------|
| <u>Years</u> | <u>Servicing of the debt (in billions CFA)</u> | <u>Exportation of goods and services (in billions CFA)</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| 1975 | 27.9 | 300 | 9.3 |
| 1976 | 48.4 | 458 | 10.6 |
| 1977 | 71.5 | 642 | 11.1 |
| 1978 | 94.4 | 638 | 14.8 |
| 1979 (estimate) | 110. | 579 | 19. |

Finally, the servicing of the foreign debt, with an increase of 22.9 billion CFA from 1977 to 1978 represented for this latter fiscal period 14.8 percent of the value of goods and services. The proportion will be

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19 percent in 1979. It will exceed 23 percent in 1980. All things being equal in other respects, capital repayments to be made between 1981 and 1985 would likely bring it to 30 percent. One can understand the insistence of the International Monetary Fund in counseling the government to make an assortment of long-term deferred payments for its future loans. Commendable advice, unfortunately easier to give than to be accepted, not by the Ivory Coast, itself, but by its financial backers.

Financial Aspect of Big Projects in Process

No one in Abidjan dreams of dissembling how preoccupying these figures are that are mentioned in documents published by the government. It is rather the opposite that is true. On the one hand, the Ivorians in charge are not desirous of inopportunately laying down the trumps in their possession that could change domestic relations, as in the case of the actual reserves of the Stabilization Fund. On the other hand, the big international cooperation and credit organizations give evidence of not taking into account that the Ivory Coast belongs to the free zone, which in fact reduces the problem of an expanding economy threatened by inflation to one of a budgetary balance that is not yet compromised.

The Ivorian developmental course does not have only admirers and, certain French methods having proved their effectiveness in adapting it when faced with disorders that prevailed in other sectors of West Africa, sectors that nevertheless were better endowed by nature, are tacitly being scrutinized. The speculative side of the national temperament makes the best of it; its pride, also. On the whole, a little lack of cordiality is preferable, for the credit of the nation, to indifference, or commiseration.

After all, pessimistic commentators often forget that things will not be "equal in other respects." The increase in the added industrial value, the decrease, which is linked to it, in the volume of importations, the development of agricultural and agro-industrial exportations are strengthening a rate of growth which would satisfy most European countries when making their appraisal. Likewise one must take into account the progressive effacement, during the forthcoming years, of an oil bill of about 40 billion CFA in 1978 and could increase if the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries] schedule, not satisfied with balancing the depreciation of the dollar, should happen to precede it.

For want of forgetting this aspect of things, other critics pay particular attention to the choice of big investments, to deplore their insufficient yield. The importance of some of them justifies attention being paid to these criticisms and the Ivorian reactions that one observes in their regard.

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The Ferkessedougou I and II, Borotou-Koro, Serebou, Zuenoula, and Marabadiassa sugar units made engineering and completely equipped installations contracts with European and Canadian firms, with the implementation of financing in the approximate amount of 250 billion CFA, Ivorian participation excluded, which represented 14.5 percent of the overall foreign debt on 31 December 1979.

Decided at a time when the world was experiencing a sugar shortage that encouraged numerous tropical countries to undertake an analogous effort, this operation was carried out in an industrial perspective (to which one doubtless today would prefer the formula of peasant plantations, involving less costly management) having a useless profusion of social superstructures. 53,700 tons of sugar were produced in 1978-1979, that is, a little less than the national consumption. There will be a tonnage of 130,000 tons in 1980 and 300,000 tons in 1983. The Ivory Coast will then be the chief exporter of sugar in West Africa, to the extent however that its cost of production is not higher than that of the world market price. As a matter of fact, it is one of the most serious problems that the Ivorian economy today has to solve.

The responsibilities for this affair are not all Ivorian. There was a time when international cooperation gladly displayed to African leaders an interest in sugar plantations. One also realizes in Abidjan that unit prices and the estimates were not looked at closely enough. Breach of contracts have shown that in certain cases prodigality verged on abuse. On the whole, while avoiding useless recriminations, one considers that an irrigation infrastructure of 30,000 hectares in any event is ambivalent. The operation is the "supporter" of 12,000 induced jobs and industrial activities. Molasses will provide basic food for the development of animal breeding. Finally, the sugar units more completely integrate the regions of marginal economy within the country, whose population has a tendency to migrate toward the south and the urban centers.

These arguments plead for patience in the search for a better yield and new outlets. The immediate perspectives of the market could be worse, the decrease in world stocks in 1979-1980 confirming a slight upward trend in prices. But above all, individual consumption--8 kg a year--should quite easily be doubled. Taking into account a demographic rate of increase of 4 percent, 185,000 tons probably will be put into circulation in 1990, and 266,000 tons in 2,000, the quality and the regularity of production making it possible, for analogous reasons, to hope also for a greater opening of the West African market.

It is obvious, finally, that the Ivory Coast, which started production too late to be a creditor in the sugar agreement concluded in Lome II, will intend in 1982 not to be excluded from it to the advantage of the ACP [expansion unknown], that arrived after it in the association. The

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attribution of a sugar quota in Europe, at a guaranteed price, will assure it the inspiration necessary to organize its management efficiently and to develop its self-consumption.

Two other big projects, the extension of the Ivorian Refining Company (SIR) installations and the complete coverage of the territory by radio-color television also cause reservations and criticisms. The former, at financing of 100 billion CFA, will double a processing capability of 2 million tons which also is enough to provide for the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Mali. Of course the project came into being and the market studies were carried out when the problems posed by the price and volume of raw supplies were not so sharp as now. But the processing by hydro-cracking of heavy oils and of refinement residues from other points on the African coast, like the eventual refinement of the light crudes that will soon be extracted from local oilfields, should make the enterprise profitable.

For some, the radio-color television project (90 billion CFA), considered as superfluous, should, from this fact, be excluded in a period of economic recession. Whatever the merits of this judgment, it is evident that it is contrary to the very essence of Ivorian dynamism. One of the principles is that adaptation to a new technology cannot be compromised with mediocrity in quality and dimension. Another, that the image of distinction of a country--whether it is a question of modern televisions, doubling the amount of those that presently are used for primary education in even the most remote villages, or of institutions dedicated to research and techniques, which little by little are found in the Versailles perspectives of Yamoussoukro--do not constitute a luxury, but the affirmation of a vocation for progress. Finally, the third principle: if it is expressed through the realization of effective management, this vocation is always the generator of new activities. One would be wrong to dispute this, in the presence of the buildings in Abidjan, symbol of the "outstanding successes" that have accumulated in 20 years.

Let us repeat that it is not a dogma, but a philosophy. It is made up of the implicit sense that the launching, pursuit, and consolidation of new activities inevitably engender financial vicissitudes which one must accept as a consequence of the game. The credibility of these activities depends furthermore on their integration with the world economy. Even if their suitability is questioned at the start, the overlapping of interests will intervene to support them. The overwhelming progression of the COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] guarantees in the Ivory Coast, multiplied by 17 from 1976 to 1979, would also tend to confirm this.

As a matter of fact, it is not the future of these projects that constitute the basis of President Houphouet-Boigny worries, but that of the peasantry whose work provides for their existence.

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New Rural Charter

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN in French 18 Jan 80 pp 119-122

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere³⁷

[Text] If it is true that the dual regulator constituted within the money zone by an interstate central bank and the French Treasury reduces the problems of the balance of payments to those of a balanced budget, nothing better attests to a normal situation in the Ivory Coast than the 1980 budget presented at the parliamentary sessions by Abdoulaye Kone, minister of Economy and Finance.⁴

With the 338 billion CFA, the general operational budget shows an increase of 11 percent compared with the preceding. There is little change in its structure, the portion regarding indirect taxes amounting to 71.3 percent, compared with 72.1 in 1979. Within this category of assessments, the importation duties and taxes portion, with an increase in revenue of 13.2 percent, go from 63.5 to 65.5 percent, while the amount of domestic taxes increases by 3 billion, without the proportion being greatly changed (19.4 instead of 19.7 percent). The value and percentage of exportation duties and taxes, on the other hand, show a slight decrease: 700 million and 14.9 percent instead of 16.7 percent. With respect to direct taxes, the amount of proportional and progressive income taxes⁵ increases by 9 billion, a percentage approximately equal to that of 1978. The tax on property and licenses and permits show only minimal revenue variations, but the percentage of the latter two increases from 2.93 to 3.25 percent, and that of the former decreases from 2 to 1.89 percent.

The Ivorian government thus in general confirms its adherence to a fiscal system that strikes at consumption, but favors enterprises and is slightly easier on rural people than city dwellers. Will the small move made in the direction of a direct fiscal policy be enough to appease the "dissatisfaction" brought out by the president in his 7 December message, and caused by the 10 percent increase in retail prices that took place during the first semester, which cancelled the effect of the partial decreases obtained by the cancellation of certain entry duties?⁶ Calculated ad valorem, the indirect duties and taxes, for the people as a whole, but especially in the cities, and without there being a need to change the schedules, constitute an expense which causes an increased burden at the same time that the cost of living increases.

If the fiscal structures remain unchanged, it is true that their content has been somewhat adjusted. The threshold of general tax liability on income has been raised, while taxes on so-called luxury commodities or activities have been increased: tobacco, drinks, oil products, registration of vehicles, etc. Furthermore, to a certain degree and to the

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advantage of young people, as a result of the elimination of some high salaries, which should result from the reform of State companies, 5,500 public office appointments will be made in 1980.

At 300 billion, the special investment and equipment budget will be the most important that the Ivory Coast has known, with an increase of 25 percent compared with 1979. It thus maintains a tradition of expansion, even though it had to be conditioned by foreign loans with inflationary drawbacks. These loans were all the more necessary since the Central Bank, through the expedient of refinancing from banking institutions and through the interest rate that it prescribes, at rates lower than European rates (7 percent for seasonal loans, rural area loans) in fact curbs domestic credit.


Evolution of the General Operational Budget and of
The Special Investment and Equipment Budget
[SIEB] (in millions CFA)

| | <u>1975</u> | <u>1976</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1980</u> |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| General budget | 126,880 | 153,700 | 198,300 | 253,650 | 277,400 | 338,400 |
| SIEB | 54,041 | 60,143 | 245,074 | 257,219 | 239,466 | 300,000 |

However, the Stabilization and Price Support Fund for Agricultural Production, before fiscal receipts and foreign aids, loans or subsidies, administered by the Autonomous Sinking Fund, remains the principal source for public investment to which it will have contributed since 1975 615 billion CFA. This means that the development and organization of agriculture are priority efforts. The allotments granted to the special investment and equipment budget will also make possible the financing of big projects, the continuation of those in process, railroad and port infrastructure projects, and the implementation of the road program which from 1976 to 1980, at a cost of 185 billion CFA, provided for the resurfacing of 192 km of roads, the reinforcement or the reconstruction of 233 km of the same type of branch roads, and the resurfacing of 980 km of dirt roads.

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Resurfaced Routes (Routes revetues)



The desire to aid the economically disadvantaged in the cities, the most vulnerable to indirect taxation, and peasants, the main force with respect to economic activity, is reflected in the special investment and equipment budget appropriations for social allotments. Even though the number of lodgings realized by the State, or with the aid of the State, exceeds 90,000, since 1960 and 29,000 since 1975, President Joupouet-Boigny, believing that the reduced financial means of this category of citizens had not been sufficiently taken into account in this field, decided that henceforth 50 percent of the programs would be set aside for them and that repayment of real estate loans furthermore were to be spread over longer periods.

Finally, coming after agriculture, transportation, construction, and urbanism, educational activities constitute one of the most important sections of the investment budget, even the third if one combines cultural

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and promotion activities, studies, and basic research, which are the subject of a separate report.

Agriculture in the Ivorian Economy

Agricultural products in 1978, with 417 billion CFA, accounted for 70.5 percent of the value of exportations, estimated at 591 billion. The decrease in cocoa and coffee prices and the drop in the volume of sales of wood had then affected at the same time the overall value of exportations, lower by 3 percent compared with 1977, and the portion concerning the 3 main products, coffee, cocoa, and wood, which went from 69.6 to 68.1 percent from 1977 to 1978, to the advantage of manufactured products, especially cocoa-flavored food products.

Evolution of Exportations
(in millions CFA)

| | <u>1975</u> | <u>1976</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1978</u> |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Agric. products | 166,277 | 300,823 | 445,358 | 417,398 |
| Coffee | 64,703 | 145,156 | 241,625 | 166,221 |
| Cocoa | 51,619 | 78,397 | 116,798 | 174,115 |
| Wood | 34,888 | 63,281 | 67,661 | 63,072 |
| Products of extractive industries | 1,160 | 593 | 265 | 16 |
| Products of mfg. industries | 107,960 | 123,755 | 160,393 | 172,303 |
| Food | 46,824 | 51,611 | 71,568 | 83,440 |
| Textiles | 12,734 | 14,962 | 21,198 | 23,562 |
| Wood | 37,643 | 15,245 | 19,488 | 18,610 |
| Water, electricity, building | — | 953 | 5,528 | 1,314 |
| Total | 275,397 | 426,124 | 611,544 | 591,571 |

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In 1979, the table of foreign sales does not show great changes, compared with 1978. Within their overall value, higher by 7 percent, the overall coffee-cocoa-wood percentage should show a slight increase. Coffee prices showed a significant increase, after the freezes that occurred in Brazil, so that for an exported tonnage approximately equal to that of 1978, the value obtained should advance to 24 percent. Cocoa prices on the contrary decreased as a consequence of the recovery of Brazilian production and because of the drops in tonnage recorded for Ghana (3 percent) and for Nigeria (20 percent), so that the quantities exported and their value could be significantly lower. At the beginning of December, the Ivory Coast's 1978-1979 cocoa tree harvest, with an increase of 2.88 percent, had not yet been negotiated. The slight upward curve observed at the end of the year causes one to hope that this waiting situation will soon end, to the relief of the Abidjan banks that fear the material or financial risks of a very protracted stockpiling.

As for wood, in third place with respect to exportation of raw products, an approximate 10 percent improvement in FOB prices has meant an appreciable increase in quantities exported. The year 1979 will be characterized by the attainment, if not the surpassing, of the 1977 results.

While the Ivory Coast's main agricultural outlets are beyond its borders, in spite of the eminent place it has won among the producer countries of cocoa, coffee, and wood, it still has only a very limited influence on their prices. Doubtless foreign sales from the food, textile, or wood industries⁷, which are based on products from the earth, contribute to a certain stabilization of revenue. This is not enough to placate the basic apprehension of the president of the republic concerning the future of national agriculture, whether with regard to food plantations or to farming for profit, in view of the unequal evolution of European and African selling prices, with a parallel increase in cost prices.

Food Plantations

Reactions concerning food agriculture are, as a matter of fact, very different from those of agriculture for profit, and sometimes even contradictory. Not very commercialized, food production is not easy to appraise. Its distribution circuits often elude inquiries. The "7 years of drought" alluded to by Houphouet-Boigny can partially explain, as a matter of fact, the price increases that characterized the year 1977. It seems more doubtful, after the abundant supply and the decrease in prices in 1978, that they are responsible for the new increases and for the relative shortage that were manifested in 1979.

With respect to these products, a uniquely African system of trade, superimposed on its own consumption, coexists with that of official circuits.

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As a matter of fact, an African farmer thinks first of the subsistence of his family. The surplus that is put into circulation by one or the other of these channels will not depend only on the importance of the harvest, but on the value of the trade instrument. Inflation entails shortage; a constraint on money causes a return of abundance. It happens that money, itself, or the prices offered, or a combination of the two elements may be more favorable to the producer in an unofficial circuit than in the established trade circuit. Among the oddest, the dried fish and cola nut circuits in Africa cover considerable areas from Cotonou to Abeche and from Dakar to Gao, with a superb indifference to tariff walls. The trade area for cereals is more restricted. However, it ignores borders, and a shortage of food products noted on Ivory Coast markets might be related to the food situation in Liberia, in Guinea, or in Upper Volta.

The existence of this traditional economy gives Africa its astonishing ability to resist cataclysms and crises, without which one would not be able to understand how northern Chad, after 16 years of civil war, continues to subsist creditably, or that, on the other hand, the drop in industrial production and in agriculture for profit has not at all affected Uganda's food situation.

The Ivory Coast's problem perhaps is less one of integrating the populations of the north in the market economy in order to strengthen national cohesion in a mystique of production, than one of sufficiently integrating them within the framework of a national division of work, to assure, at remunerative prices, supplies for urban centers and regions where the development of plantations for exportation results in a certain food deficit. The creation of vast perimeters of industrial plantations responds to this objective only to the degree that it checks the migration of peasants who are motivated by illusions concerning the south. But it does not return to food plantations the arms that leave them and it engenders a regional inflation that encourages the traditional farmer to retain his harvest. Under these circumstances, one may wonder about the duration of the improvement that can result for the nation.

The present perspective, such as it is expressed by the young agro-economists in Bra-Kanon's department, prefers, and rightly so, it seems, peasant plantations combined with agricultural enterprises that utilize salaried employees. More profitable as far as management is concerned, they encourage reliable attachment on the part of the peasant to food plantations and a desire for signs of money, which augments consumption and broadens the dimension of the domestic market. They make easy balancing possible, according to the economic situation, between self-subsistence and the market economy and, when the latter is more attractive, facilitate recourse to official outlets rather than contraband channels.

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Essentially, a balance can only be realized by supporting selling prices, by regulatory intervention on the part of the State regarding commercialization, stockpiling, or distribution, or improvement in productivity. It is there that present solutions are being prepared in the Ivory Coast, to maintain and develop the two types of plantations. By their originality, they constitute a veritable charter for peasant production.

New Forms of Farmer and State Cooperation

The deterioration in trade terms has been repeatedly denounced by African leaders. In his 7 December message, the Ivorian president did it in striking and moving terms that merit being quoted:

"From 1960 to 1975, taking into account several factors--labor difficulties, price increases with respect to fertilizers and energy, monetary erosion, etc.--European prices were multiplied by 5, even by 10 for certain products. But for cocoa, which sold for 250 F CFA a kilo in 1959, we this year were offered 500 or 600 F CFA. Well, the African farmer has to wait 5 to 6 years for the first harvest. The rapid aging of the plant requires fertilizers that will cost five times more; the indispensable fight against "capsides" requires products that are no less expensive; let alone the material necessary for the maintenance of the plant."

And Houphouet-Boigny concluded:

"In 10 or 15 years at the latest, I fear that the production of cocoa and coffee will decline, because our young people will not want to do the manual labor that the maintenance of the plants requires with archaic tools and for a price that is not very remunerative...Is one going to reject, because of lack of understanding and selfishness, these peasants who ask only to work on the risky road of enterprise? We are worried."

The due date is not an imaginary one. If it seems far off to some, it is because it will appear only when a certain threshold of "intolerance" has been reached. Likewise, a turning point will be reached in European cities when, as a result of the increase in the price of motor fuel, traffic will suddenly lessen. Things could develop very quickly then. No more than Europeans will agree to sacrifice the fundamental principle of their moral and cultural tradition to the illusory conquest of an indigestible liquid, will Africans resign themselves to become assimilated as slaves in a type of civilization that they have done without for thousands of years. The change, unfortunately, will not occur without upheavals.

It was in order to forestall the due date that France has been at work, since before 1960, by putting into practice African price supports on its domestic market. The opening of Europe to these products, the financial

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and technical aid made available to the new states by the EEC for a time seemed to compensate for the dismantling of the system. As a matter of fact, the only specific measure brought about by the Community to the relative devaluation of tropical production was the STABEX [expansion unknown]. Even though its application was extended by Lome II to a greater number of articles, it remains limited in time, incomplete, retroactive, not free of charge (except for the most disadvantaged countries and in certain cases), and the theoretical application of its endowments to certain conversion or diversification shares poses problems. It is hoped that the new appeal made in Katiola to the great nations will be heard, but it is difficult to harbor very many illusions in this regard. In wanting to extend its actions throughout the entire planet, the Lome association now overlaps with the World Bank, but it misses what should have been its true vocation.

If the chances to obtain stability and the progressive improvement of prices on the domestic markets are slim, the intentions announced in Katiola regarding development of the peasant situation in the Ivory Coast on the other hand open up new, realistic prospects. "Aid to the peasantry will be translated, through reinforcement of the sector, into a free supply to farmers of fertilizers for certain plantations, and also the ploughing."

The formula is backed by an agricultural philosophy that three regional developmental companies will soon be charged with implementing. And what does this mean? Since the peasant is not assured suitable remuneration through sales, this will be sought through improved productivity, and the State at the same time will provide the funds that are necessary to develop forms of rural work that are less irksome. The foundation of an economy that in 20 years has produced an astonishing diversification of activities, agriculture will receive a fair return from public reinvestment of capital and services, not only for studies, commercialization, or management, but for the methods, themselves. Thus a system may emerge wherein, as in the case of what has already been successfully put into practice within the framework of perimeters of specialized vocations, the public authority will be responsible for the pulling up of tree roots, the ploughing, and the processing, while the farmer retains the responsibility for handling the sowing, weeding, and harvesting, with the amount from sales for the improvement of yields and the increase in tonnage coming before the paying off of fertilizers and implements.

The Reform of State Companies

The reorganization of State companies concerns agriculture in that a number of the companies should normally be integrated into the new regional developmental plan. However, the reform, announced as imminent by President Houphouet-Boigny in Katiola, is more far-reaching and will affect the entire economy. It should be achieved, with the cuts that it entails, at the end

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of the month of March. Mathieu Ekra, minister of State, was given this very close date for such a particularly difficult task.

It is not too much to say that the state of uncertainty hanging over certain ministries with respect to the precise objectives and methods of operation sometimes borders on panic. Often created in the first place in order to compensate for the absence of private initiatives, and having succeeded unequally, many of these companies became weighed down as they went along with lateral activities that were more or less profitable--some, like the SOGEFIHA (Company for the Financial Management of Housing), recorded deficits of several billion--and they pervert the operation of competition through prices established beyond the sphere of any commercial rule. The staff of these enterprises, better paid than mere employees, is under the real responsibility of the State, although they skim off assets at the top, which does not contribute to the good functioning of administrative services.

Not having ever linked any ideological taboo to these organizations, but having in short considered them as mere expedients, the Ivory Coast, through the voice of its president, was able to decide to remove the abscess without raising any political question, thus also displaying devotion to the liberal economy proclaimed, but without specifying how he intended to go about it. In particular, the expression of "handing State operations over to the private sector," that frequently appeared in connection with the canning industries in Abidjan, was not used anywhere in the Katiola speech.

One counts 30 companies in the Ivory Coast whose assets are supplied 100 percent by the State, and 18 limited companies in which the State's majority profit sharing can go from 50 to 100 percent. In addition, there are many companies where the State is a minority partner, not to mention public institutions of an industrial or commercial nature having supplementary budgets or budgetary allotments, like the Autonomous Sinking Fund, or the Autonomous Port of Abidjan allotments. These latter do not seem to be affected by the reform, except perhaps from the perspective of alignment or realignment of the status of their personnel with that of the public function.

The eventual negotiation of the minority participation of the State in certain private businesses also seems foreign to the spirit of the reform, the tendency up to now having been, to the contrary, for the State to leave "a calling card" with the new boards of directors, at least when it was a question of a far-reaching matter. As a matter of fact, in this case it is a question of the management of investments, the public interest alone being the issue that would decide whether to keep or to liquidate the shares in the statement of affairs.

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For the 48 companies mentioned above, those in which private and public capital co-exist will of course be more open to the reform, if only because of the ease with which already existing private shareholders can repurchase the shares of the State. Again one must take into account that the objective of many among them, whether entirely of the State or those in the joint economy, would adapt poorly to a turning over to the private sector, whether it is a question of the Stabilization Fund for Agriculture Production, itself, or the National Lottery, banks like the BNEC (National Savings and Credit Bank) or the Loan Company of the Ivory Coast, or finally of companies that by agreement have the monopoly of certain public services: Air Ivoire (Ivorian Air Line), INTELCO [International Telecommunications of the Ivory Coast], SODECI [Water Utility Company], EEC (Ivory Coast Electric Power Company), SOTRA (Abidjan Transportation Company), etc.

In fact, only a few of these companies appear susceptible of being completely repurchased by private operators. In Abidjan one cites the case of IVOIRE OUTILS (Manufacture of Farm Tools). A certain number of State companies having to do with agriculture will be able to return simply and purely to the administrative sector, with some eventual management and treasury opportunities, taking into account their particular geographic position. This is more conceivable, furthermore, for research or promotion companies than for those that have to guarantee an industrial or commercial exploitation, like the SODESUCRE [Company for the Development of Sugar Cane Plantations and the Industrialization and Marketing of Sugar]. Finally, those whose failure is most obvious will be dissolved.

The reform stems from a spirit of determination that will not astonish the Ivory Coast. One somewhat envies its government for launching into this surgical operation without fearing to state that the interests of the State have priority over "vested rights." Even if the scarcity of domestic credit does not make the operation easy, it is of interest to note the clear pragmatism, removed from all consideration of doctrine, with which the leadership team commits itself at the same time to two reforms, obviously very unequal in scope, but of which the profoundly novel aspect of the former contrasts with the distrust of the State control that characterizes the second.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 30 December 1979 law concerning financial adjustment reduced this total to 220 billion.
2. The Autonomous Sinking Fund, initially charged only with responsibility for State loans, in 1978 was made responsible for overall foreign financing in the public and para-public sector.
3. See our 11 January 1980 issue: "Growth and the Crisis."

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A typesetting error, which our readers probably discovered from the context, made it appear in the preceding article that the rates of overall growth of 4.9 percent in 1975 and 5.5 percent in 1977 were those of the Ivory Coast. Actually, they concerned the average rates of annual growth of the countries under development that are exporters of non-energy raw materials, as established by the OECD. The Ivory Coast rate for 1978, on the contrary, is a remarkable 7 percent.

4. This budget was analyzed in our 11 January issue (page 79).
5. IGR (general income tax), IRCM (tax on stocks and bonds), employer contribution, tax on salaries and wages, tax on profits.
6. Entry duties for pharmaceutical products were suppressed in March 1979.
7. These three industrial branches in 1978 competed for 21 percent of the overall exportations value.

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IVORY COAST

FUTURE OF ECONOMIC 'SHOWCASE' EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb 80 p 41

[Article by Jonathan Kolela: "On the Threshold of a New Decade"]

[Text] Showcase of "African prosperity," Abidjan has for some time in the past, and no doubt for a long period in the future, entered into an era of austerity.

"I am very happy to be with you again after 2 and 1/2 months of absence. I know that the country has suffered greatly from the alarming pieces of news that have been spread about concerning my state of health. I would like to say that the prophets of doom went to all that trouble for nothing." In these words the Ivorian Chief of State, Mr Houphouet-Boigny, on his return from Geneva, addressed the vast crowd of Abidjan townspeople gathered to greet him at Port-Bouet Airport on Saturday, 22 September last. Obviously concerned primarily with reassuring everyone about his state of health, on which contradictory rumors had been circulating unceasingly, the Ivorian president, now aged 74, added: "I felt well enough to go back to work."

These assurances concerning the health of the man affectionately known to his people as "the Old Man" ["le Vieux"] have not served to silence the question in Ivorian public opinion and more particularly among the classes active in politics on the succession of the present Chief of State. All the more so as 1980, a crucial year, will see the holding of the PDCI-RDA [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally] several months ahead of original schedule, then the municipal and parliamentary elections, and at the end of the year, the presidential election. Though there is no reason to expect profound upheavals in political and economic matters, the fact remains that these various polls will result in new men and new cadres on the scene, both in the government and the Party apparatus, and will mark the reshuffling of jobs among the "old bolsheviks," comrades from the first days, and other barons of the regime who have been running the country for nearly 20 years.

These inevitable readjustments might be a real turning-point, insofar as on one hand they will result less from established constitutional practice

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than from compromises between the different political clans, and on the other, because they coincide with the deterioration in the economic situation and the worsening of the living conditions of most Ivorians. In fact some political observers believe that the Constitutional provision now in force making the president of the National Assembly--Philippe Yace--chief of state-designate should the post fall vacant, might be abrogated. As a next step, will there be movement in the direction of creating a new post of prime minister (a hypothesis once again recently rejected by Ivorian rulers) or towards creating the post of vice president of the republic, who would, in the event, take over the responsibility for the government?

A Parallel Market

At the moment there are a good 10 possibilities--including Philippe Yace (who seems to be the president's choice); Messrs Auguste Denise, minister of state; Mathieu Ekra, minister of state for reform of government-owned companies; Mamadou Coulibaly, president of the economic and social council; Jean-Baptiste Mockey, "old bolshevik" [comrade of the first hour]; Lamine Fadika, minister of marine; Abdoulaye Kone, minister of the economy, finance and the plan; Konan Bedie, expert at the World Bank, etc.

It is also apparent that the Ivory Coast is moving into a phase of more moderate growth. The president of the National Assembly recognized this at the opening of the session on the budget on 3 October last, when he stated: "More than ever, the hour of austerity, suitably considered choices, and rigorous and controlled management has struck."

After a period of strong growth, which lasted nearly 20 years, the springs of the economic machine appear to be, if not broken, at least overstrained. To be sure, in 1978-79, for the second year in a row, the Ivory Coast was the world's biggest cocoa producer. The production was, however, clearly down from that of the preceding year.

As for coffee production, even though it is operating, it still remains below the average level attained during 1970-1977. Added to that, for one thing, is the decision made in October by the Ivory Coast not to market its cocoa unless the price rose substantially (some 190,000 tons of beans are supposed to have been put in storage for this reason), and in a general way, the drop in world market prices for cocoa, coffee and lumber, three products at the head of the list of Ivorian exports. This unfortunate combination of circumstances could aggravate the social situation, born of a rapid economic growth insufficiently controlled and an unequal distribution of the national wealth. Thus, for example, the housing crisis made possible the building of sudden and solid fortunes in real estate speculation. The falling apart of sanitation services, has the backlash effect of substantial profits for the owners of private clinics. The inadequacy of urban transport has similarly been profitably exploited by certain transportation entrepreneurs or taxi-owners.

Finally, population growth and the consequent rapid increase in the number of schoolchildren (especially at the second degree [eleventh grade?])

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level) are giving rise to a parallel market in education, in which the quality of instruction leaves much to be desired and tuition costs are specifically beyond the means of the popular masses.

The problems facing the Ivory Coast remain serious, as the chief of state himself often said when vigorously denouncing corruption, bad management of industrial enterprises, and the rapaciousness of a new bourgeois class that has developed over the last 20 years. In other words the Ivory Coast at the dawning of its 20th year of independence is at a turning point that could prove decisive for the 1980's.

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KENYA

KENYA 'TO BECOME ONE OF MAIN AFRICAN PARTNERS OF U.S.'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 p 21

[Article by Jos Blaise Alima: "The Kenyan Card"]

[Text] Of the three Western countries, Federal Germany, Great Britain and the United States, which he visited in February, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi certainly accorded the highest importance to the American part of his journey. In the eyes of the Washington government, the trip by Jomo Kenyatta's successor came at just the right time to enable Jimmy Carter to spell out his intentions. On the ritual altar of supply and demand, the United States is getting out of it at the lowest cost by offering Kenya, threatened with famine, 60,000 tons of corn, 30,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of rice.

To tell the truth, this "gift" does not have the earmarks of a sacrifice. With respect to cereals, America has had some to redistribute since its government's decision to cancel the deliveries promised to the Soviet Union. This amounts to saying that Uncle Sam is by far the major winner in the operation. In fact, as a quid pro quo, Daniel Arap Moi has agreed to furnish the American Government facilities for its naval forces in the port of Mombasa. The Kenyan president did, it is true, reject an American military base in Kenya. But he approved other United States requests. In an initial stage, this will mean the stocking of American military materiel in the port of Mombasa. In addition, this city's airfield can be used by the U.S. Air Force as a supply base for its operations in the vicinity of the [Persian] Gulf.

Daniel Arap Moi's American trip will thus have resulted in calming the fears aroused by Jomo Kenyatta's disappearance. Actually, some of Washington's diplomatic strategists were afraid of seeing Kenya, like other countries in the area, let itself be seduced by the socialist temptation. Even if a complete about-face were to be excluded, it could be feared that Kenya, an American satellite, might be contaminated by the "red disease." Aren't northern Ethiopia, Tanzania in the south under communist control? And then there is Uganda which has become a protectorate of Tanzania, and Somalia whose divorce from Moscow has not led to the hoped for reconciliation with

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the Western camp. For Washington it was not only a matter of having a window on the Indian Ocean. There had to be an ally of consequence in the area that might serve as its bridgehead in Africa.

Up to now that role was traditionally reserved for Nigeria. The United States has thus been seen to use the Lagos government for specific operations on the continent.

At that time Nigeria was the United States' major client in Black Africa. One can bet that henceforth things are going to change considerably. Kenya, becoming with Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana and Zambia one of the United States' key African partners, can only see its star in the ascendant. Nairobi's decision to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games fits into this context. The defection of this country, a reservoir of really able athletes, will prevent sportsmen from experiencing those moments of intense emotion of which spectators dream. At the same time it will underscore the American gendarme's stranglehold on a key country in that strategic area which is what East Africa is.

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KENYA

BRIEFS

GEOTHERMAL POWERPLANT PROJECT--The Kenya Powerplant Company Ltd (Electricity House, POB 30099, Nairobi) published a qualification notice, with a view to the calls for tender foreseen for the beginning of February, next. The calls for tender involve the supply of material in connection with the sinking of 11 geothermal shafts at the Olkaria site, near Lake Naivasha, in the Rift Valley. Interested companies with experience in this area (which they must be able to document) are invited to submit their bids as soon as possible to the project's consulting engineers, Merz and McLellan (Amberley, Killingworth, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE 12 ORS, United Kingdom). It will be recalled that three Japanese companies have already received orders for US\$11 million worth of equipment to be used in the geothermal powerplant which the West German firm of Brown-Boveri is to build for the Kenya Power Company (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 31 August 1979 and 26 October 1979 pp 2398 and 2903, respectively). The overall project, the estimated cost of which is US\$15.5 million, is being financed by the World Bank (IBRD) and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). It should be ready to start operations in 1981 and will provide approximately 15 million watts of power, or 10 percent of Kenya's energy requirements. It would appear that there has been a slight delay, not in building the plant nor in the establishment of the transmission lines, but in the sinking of the shafts, to judge by the statements made in December 1978 both by the Kenya Power Company and Merz and McLellan. (See MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 29 December 1978 p 3571) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 150] 7129

FRG RELATIONS--Kenya's second major trading partner, following Great Britain, is the FRG in terms of both exports and imports, according to Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Ouko of Kenya. In 1978-1979, West German financial and technical aid amounted to 145 million DM, representing an increase of 20 percent over the preceding year. FRG's aid to Kenya is evinced in a number of different development projects, particularly in the improvement of means of communication, water supplies and geological studies. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 150] 7129

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

JAPANESE AID FOR AIRPORT--Japan has just converted into a gift a loan of nearly \$24 million granted to Malawi in 1978 for the construction of the international airport at Lilongwe, the new capital of the country. The Japanese ambassador to Malawi, Senkuro Saiki, announced this news on 14 January in Lilongwe at the time of signing an additional gift to Malawi of \$740,000. The new airport under construction will replace the Chileka international airport, about 13 km from Blantyre, the former capital and principal commercial city of the country. Two loans have already been granted for the financing of the project: one by the African Development Bank (ADB), the other by a group of banks headed by the Chase Manhattan Bank. [Test] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 269] 8143

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NAMIBIA

BRIEFS

CONTRABAND IVORY INVESTIGATIONS--According to the South African newspaper, THE CITIZEN, ivory worth several million dollars has been smuggled out of Namibia during the last few years. The newspaper reveals that this ivory reportedly was transported particularly by South African military airplanes and that the attorney general of the territory, Don Brunette, has begun an investigation. This information follows recent revelations in the South African press of elephant and large game hunts in Namibia in which several high officials are said to have taken part, including the former administrator of the territory, Jannie de Wet. These revelations had given rise to many protests over the less than sportsmanlike manner in which these hunts were conducted. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Feb 80 p 274] 8143

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

INDIAN ARMS INDUSTRY STUDY--A 10-member delegation of the institute for police planning and strategic studies recently visited India to study its defense and arms industry. The delegation, led by Gen Zamani Lekwot, former military governor of Rivers State, included high officials of the army and civil service. General Lekwot said on his return to Lagos that he had been very impressed by India's self-sufficiency in defense, and he saw no reason why Nigeria, inspired by its example, could not do likewise. In this connection he quoted a statement by the former military head of state, Gen Olusegun Obasanjo: "If India can do it, why not Nigeria?" [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 512-513]

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RHODESIA

BRITISH SEMBLANCE OF IMPARTIALITY HIT

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 3 Mar 80 pp 26-27

[Article by Mike Shuster: "Elections; Intimidations"]

[Text] The way in which British authorities have designed the application of the Lancaster House accord has had the effect of giving the military victory to the Rhodesian security forces. Furthermore, it is very difficult to determine whether the overwhelming majority of the Zimbabwe people will be assured of their right to express themselves freely in the uncertain parliamentary elections. The danger is now clearly apparent to all political observers in Salisbury: The interpretation which Lord Soames gives to the Lancaster House accord risks perpetuating the reign of the racist minority in Zimbabwe.

At any rate, the agreement has not instituted a ceasefire in Rhodesia. While the current confrontations are not of the same nature as those which for 10 years have bloodied this country of 7 million Africans and 200,000 white settlers, the war is undeniably continuing between Rhodesian security forces and the largest faction of the Patriotic Front, Robert Mugabe's ZANU -- that is, the ZANU-PF.

"We Are Impartial"

Everything began in January this year when the governor, Lord Soames, deployed Rhodesian security forces throughout Zimbabwe territory. He thereby assured them of the advantage they had never been able to gain in the field against the ZANU-PF, while claiming that the ZANU armed forces, the ZANLA, had violated the ceasefire and that Mugabe refused to bring all his forces together in the designated camps.

However, all impartial accounts agree that the ZANU guerrillas and those of the ZAPU (ZIPRA) of Joshua Nkomo did actually regroup at the 16 rallying points assigned to them. Naturally, one cannot forget the fact that small groups of the ZANLA have not yet gone there, first of all, because this is a matter of guerrilla warfare and not a war of positions. Furthermore, "there is a very simple reason," Robert Mugabe told us. "We did not have

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enough time to bring our 20,000 fighting men together at their respective camps. In fact, the Lancaster accord gave us scarcely 10 days to accomplish that enormous task. I called Governor Soames the 'chief violator' of the ceasefire and I told him so to his face. That is what he is. He was the first to violate the ceasefire by refusing to keep the Rhodesian forces and their auxiliaries at their bases, as stipulated by the Lancaster accord, which clearly states that they were to be disengaged. What did they expect of us? Surrender? That is ridiculous, inadmissible, intolerable, unacceptable.

"Are they criticizing some of our forces for not having gone back to their camps? At the present time, we no longer feel any obligation to assemble them because what does that signify, a ceasefire between two adversaries when it is unilateral, with one retaining its freedom of action and the other being deprived of it? How can they criticize the scattering of some of our forces when the British are deploying all their forces throughout our country, sowing panic, terror and death?"

Despite the controversy surrounding this problem, the camps now house 2,000 guerrilla soldiers: 16,000 from the ZANU and 6,000 from the ZAPU. But the situation remains explosive because it is a secret to no one that during this entire time, the British have deployed over 90,000 men throughout the territory, including 60,000 from the Rhodesian security forces, 20,000 from the "auxiliary" forces which Muzorewa's private army joined, and thousands of reservists and policemen scattered from one end of the territory to the other. In addition, every district commissioner has his own military forces and thousands of white settlers are also heavily armed.

It is therefore the Rhodesian colonial forces that are now occupying the country, while the guerrilla soldiers who went to their 16 camps are encircled.

But what are the missions from the Commonwealth countries sent to Zimbabwe to ensure respect for the application of the ceasefire doing? What do they say? "We cannot ascertain exactly what is happening," some of the members admit. "We are assigned to the Rhodesian security forces, but we have no means of verifying their stories when they accuse the ZANU soldiers of violating the ceasefire."

In other words, the British authorities are giving free reign to the Rhodesian colonial forces to "clean out" all the regions of the country, particularly the ones long inaccessible to them because they were solidly held by the ZANLA and therefore outside the reach of Muzorewa and Smith. If there is "fighting" today, is it not more likely to be resistance on the part of certain inhabitants of these regions to the racist forces of aggression?

"We are impartial," claim the official British circles. How can they make such a claim when they mobilized to try to weaken the patriotic forces and thereby strengthen the Rhodesian security troops, when they prevent the

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free circulation of newsmen anxious to accompany ZANU-PF leaders on their election campaign tours?

How can they make such a claim when a British spokesman answered a question I had put to him about why he refused to divulge the size of the Rhodesian security forces deployed in the country with this vulgar reply: "Because we do not want some disgusting individuals to know how many brave boys we have sent...." Such an atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty, for which the arbitrary policy of Lord Soames and his conservative government -- a policy denounced by the Security Council and the Commonwealth countries -- is essentially responsible, inevitably leads to the question: Who is intimidating whom? One of the Britishers in charge of overseeing the elections admitted to me that he thought the deployment of so many Rhodesian forces with their artillery was in itself a form of intimidation. What then is one to say about the hundreds of incidents and arrests of backers of Robert Mugabe's ZANU?

In truth, the British are doing everything to prevent Mugabe from taking power, although they know quite well that the majority of the people are with him and for him and that he has a very good chance of winning out despite the campaign of denigration and intimidation that has reached the point of assassination attempts.

But even if the ZANU victory should come about, Lord Soames still has another substantial trump card: Actually, the constitution negotiated at Lancaster House gives him power which his own spokesman, Kieran Prendergast, describes as "very broad." He can in fact choose any elected candidate to form a candidate unless any one of the candidates obtains a majority in Parliament. Now then, out of the 100 seats in the Assembly, 20 are already reserved for the white majority. Out of the remaining 80, in order for a single party to obtain 51, it would have to obtain over 66 percent of the votes of the black electorate.

This means that if a movement does not obtain over two-thirds of the votes cast, the governor could ask a member of a minority party to set up a government. The "majority" could then be achieved by a coalition between the whites and some of the close African parties, and 31 deputies from those parties would then suffice. Thanks to this catch, the Lancaster House accord could result in the continuation of a minority regime in Zimbabwe.

But can Lord Soames ignore the will of the Zimbabwe people, who have fought for 10 years to win their national sovereignty? The coming months will tell the tale.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

CCCE LOANS TO AGRICULTURE--On 20 December 1979, the CCCE granted Senegal a 17.6 million (French) franc loan (880 million CFA francs), to which must be added three French Aid and Cooperation (FAC) subsidies for a total of 4.4 billion French francs (220 billion CFA francs). The first of these loans will enable the country to raise its millet stocking capacity, and to render technical assistance, over a 2-year period, for Senegalese grain policy. The second loan will be directed to insuring the planting of 700 to 900 hectares of forests and to the establishment of an overall forest rehabilitation plan. The third transaction involves hydraulics at the village level in the three regions of low rainfall. A complete mapping of the water situation will be made for the whole area and high priority projects undertaken. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 135] 7129

EDF AID TO STOCKRAISING--The European Development Fund will grant Senegal a subsidy of 1,463,000 European currency units (ECU) and, in addition and under special terms, a loan of 1,500,000 ECU, representing a total of some 860 billion CFA francs to further the development of stockraising in the pastoral-forest areas. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 135] 7129

CCCE LOAN TO BNDS--The CCCE, on 20 December 1979, granted Senegal's National Development Bank (BNDS) a loan of approximately 50 million French francs (2.5 billion CFA francs), similar to one extended in 1978. The resources are to be used by the state to cover its share in the (self)-financing of several productive investment programs, facilitated basically by subsidies and loans from the international community. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 147] 7129

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SOUTH AFRICA

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER DENIES COLLUSION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Feb 80 p 334

[Text] In reply to a written question by Bernard Deschamps, deputy (PC), French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet said (Official Journal--National Assembly Debates, 21 January 1980) that there is no "collusion" with South Africa in any area. He continued: "French-South African relations imply neither support for nor approval of the policy of the Pretoria authorities. Also, on a number of occasions the government has condemned the apartheid system. On the economic level the relations are not as important as some affirm. France's trade with South Africa amounts to less than 1 percent of the latter's foreign trade.

"Construction by French companies of a nuclear power plant near Capetown cannot be regarded as evidence of close ties in the nuclear field. The Koeberg installations have a purely commercial purpose, like dozens of other plants in operation in numerous countries. They will be under strict international controls and thus could not be used by South Africa to develop a nuclear weapon armament.

"It should also be recalled that the government, for humanitarian reasons, has several times intervened on behalf of persons condemned for opposing the apartheid regime. It may do so again in favor of James Mange whose case will soon come up on appeal: when the judicial procedures have been completed, and if their result justifies, the government will consult with its partners the Nine, as it has done in similar cases in the past."

Deschamps had on 29 November called on the government to apply the UN General Assembly recommendations on 21 November 1979 on economic relations with the apartheid regime. Also, on 12 December the General Assembly condemned "continued collaboration" between South Africa and "the United Kingdom, FRG, France, Japan, Belgium, Israel and Italy."

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

ROAD CONSTRUCTION--An officer of the Tanzanian Public Works Ministry on 11 January stated at Dar es Salaam that construction of the Morogoro-Dodoma and the Songea-Makambaku highways would begin next April. The British company, Balfour Beatty, is responsible for the latter link, having won the international bid for tenders. The road will be 325 km long and the work, to be concluded in 1984, will be assisted by a British donation of 500 million shillings. The Morogoro-Dodoma connection, representing a total of 260 km, will be built by a Brazilian company, Engenharia, Comercio e Industria. A loan of 395 million shillings was obtained by the Tanzanian Government for the execution of this project. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 150] 7129

DAR ES SALAAM AIRPORT EXPANSION--Studies carried out with a view to expanding the airport facilities at Dar es Salaam, based on the granting of aid by France, began last November and should be ready in April of this year. They are being executed by Aeroport de Paris. The expansion project should get under way by the end of this year. It should be noted that the plans provide for a new passenger terminal, and a new control tower, as well as for enlargement of the runways. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jan 80 p 150] 7129

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UPPER VOLTA

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS OF OPPOSITION REPORTED

Paris JUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 Feb 80 p 44

[Article by special envoy to Ouagadougou Francoise Hubscher: "The Long Wait"]

[Text] Upper Voltan democracy is currently going through a period of alliances. First, the opposition. On 6 November a new party, the Upper Voltan Progressive Front (FPV), was born, one in which we find socialist militants from Prof Joseph Ki-Zerbo's Upper Voltan Progressive Union (UPV) and the Refusal Front, a dissident faction of the majority party, the Upper Voltan Democratic Union (UDV). To tell the truth, Joseph Ouedraogo, the leader of the Refusal Front, had hardly any choice. The fourth largest party in terms of number of deputies, the Refusal Front found itself eliminated de facto when in May 1979 the National Assembly instituted the three-party system provided for in the Constitution.

Discreet Return

Where could Joseph Ouedraogo find a new niche for himself? It was out of the question for him to return to the UDV. His rivalry with one of the strongest UDV personalities, current president of the National Assembly Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, is legendary. Also out of the question to rejoin the second largest Upper Voltan party, the National Union for the Defense of Democracy (UNDD). There was nothing left for Joseph Ouedraogo but to ask his childhood friend, who is also his wife's uncle, Professor Ki-Zerbo, to take him in. "On condition that my party's political line will remain unchanged and that leadership unity be preserved," the professor replied. Joseph Ouedraogo, the former union activist, accepted.

As for the majority, UDV leaders are slowly moving toward the UNDD. At the end of January, the first UNDD congress held a surprise in store for us. The replacement of "Maurice's" son, Hermann Yameogo, by Emmanuel Zoma as head of the party retained our attention less than the appointment of Maurice Yameogo as tenth propaganda secretary in the National Political Bureau. Has the ex-president regained his civil rights in the most absolutely discreet fashion? The fact that the prime minister and the president of the National Assembly made a point of attending the closing session

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of the congress leads us to think so. Furthermore, the next day the prime minister, Joseph Conombo, Gerard Kango Ouedraogo and ex-President Maurice Yameogo again went to Yamoussoukro, Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny's home, to discuss a possible merger of their parties. From now on, we may assume that, while retaining its autonomy vis-a-vis the UDV, the UNDD will rejoin the ranks of the presidential majority. What does the UNDD hope to gain? A minimal action program worked out in conjunction with all the nation's active forces.

The FPV also demands this minimal program. In its eyes, this is the only way to get away from the dangerous ultraconservatism the country has gotten itself bogged down in. Everyone recognizes that General Lamizana is a sincere democrat, profoundly attached to the principle of respect for human rights. But many reproach him for not exercising his power firmly. "Yet, he was democratically elected to lead a people known for its taste for discipline and a hierarchical system," a former minister who with regret recalled Maurice Yameogo's strong manner remarked. "Only recently, the government shelved the bill to limit the right to strike which it had after all narrowed down to its essentials following a number of sit-down strikes these past few months." For their part, Professor Ki-Zerbo's partisans are getting impatient and are worried: "Everything is happening as though the president and his government had all the time in the world to play with. A number of projects have been pigeonholed. Social inequities are increasing and, even more serious, Upper Voltans, especially young people, are demobilizing, losing interest in their country's future. Still, they would be ready to follow a clearly asserted political determination."

Will General Lamizana finally assume the initiative? No one dares predict the future in Upper Volta. But people are afraid that the waiting game, which seems to have become a veritable political doctrine, may end up leading us into an adventure which no politician of today hopes for.

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ZAMBIA

PRESIDENT KAUNDA LOOKS FORWARD TO TIES WITH ZIMBABWE

LD211057 London THE TIMES in English 21 Mar 80 p 6 LD

[Apparent interview of Zambian President Kaunda by Ruth Weiss; datelined Lusaka, 20 March]

[Excerpts] "If I could have danced, I would have done it then", President Kaunda of Zambia said when asked about his immediate reaction to the Rhodesian election results.

"We have suffered for the independence of Angola...of Mozambique, but not the the extent that we suffered for the independence of Zimbabwe", President Kaunda said. "Now we can look forward to better things, in terms of cooperation between our brothers in Zimbabwe and ourselves."

Already this cooperation is taking concrete shape. A summit of the front-line states, called for April 1, promises to be a summit with a difference. Already an invitation has gone to Zimbabwe's new government. "For the first time since we have been meeting we will discuss nothing but economic development and cooperation", President Kaunda said. "It's a fantastic feeling. It makes one feel good."

Dr Kaunda hesitated when asked about the role South Africa could play. He could not decide for the heads of state whether they would even discuss, let alone decide, to ask South Africa to join in regional cooperation. He thought that South Africa's participation could lend that country a respectability it did not deserve.

Besides, there was the problem of South Africa's economic power. "We would be tying ourselves to the apron strings of a giant."

Even economic cooperation with an independent Zimbabwe could cause problems. "They (the Zimbabweans) are much stronger than we are...they built their infrastructure at our expense" (that is, with the revenue accruing to the old federation from northern Rhodesia's copper belt).

And during the UDI period, he said, they had created a new manufacturing industry. Zambia could thus find her own industrial efforts frustrated if

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Zimbabwe-made goods flooded the market. On the other hand, it could not be denied that Zambia's economy was in the doldrums and that there were tremendous shortages of precisely the sort of consumer items available from "down south".

It depends on President Kaunda's travelling plans whether he can attend the Zimbabwean celebrations on 18 April. He postponed a trip to four countries in the Far East in March, thinking that independence would be attained then. Now that the ceremonies are planned for April, he will have to see if he can rearrange his appointments again.

Dr Kaunda is pragmatic about the remaining problems of southern Africa. He hopes that the Namibian issue can soon be solved. "The efforts of the United Nations are vital to end this war", he says. And though some of his close associates have already adapted the favourite Kaunda song of "together we'll cross the Zambezi" to "together we'll cross the Limpopo", the Zambian president is careful to support Mr Robert Mugabe's stance--that neighbouring countries cannot make themselves liable to South African attacks.

He called for change in South Africa's policies and said that he would "even speak to the South Africans if it would help". He considers South Africa's possible nuclear capability to be a threat for all African countries south of the Sahara, and denounces both South Africa and its supporters for providing it with this capability.

Dr Kaunda defended his recent arms purchase from the Soviet Union, saying that for years he had knocked in vain at western doors "and when we were bombed, the West remained silent". If this deal gave anyone in the West the idea that he was "going communist", this was "unfounded and unfair". He had warned the West that liberation movements would look to China and the Soviet Union for arms and when young people were trained in the use of arms, it was natural that they would also learn the ideology behind those arms. But he refuted any suggestion that Zambia's policy on communism had been changed in any way, because of the Soviet arms purchase.

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